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The rise of the Internet and so-called digital trade has significantly
transformed international trade. International trade law, however, has
lagged behind in regulating the phenomenon. Decades-long negotiations at
the World Trade Organization (WTO) over digital trade have largely
stalled, while efforts to deal with the issue at the bilateral and regional levels
have resulted in inconsistent and fragmented rules.
This article discusses the challenges posed by digital trade to
international trade law and the best ways to meet those challenges. It
contributes to the discourse on digital trade by advocating for a back-tobasics approach. It argues that instead of undertaking negotiations on
controversial issues, the world trading community should focus on
negotiating basic framework rules and applying widely accepted WTO legal
principles to digital trade. This approach would best advance the WTO’s
digital trade agenda while preserving the legitimacy of its multilateral
process.
* University of Florida Research Foundation Professor & University
Term Professor, University of Florida Levin College of Law. The research
for this article was supported by a summer research grant from the University of Florida Levin College of Law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The growth of the Internet has significantly transformed
the modern economy.1 The Internet contributes to higher
productivities and lower trading costs in traditional industries.2 More importantly, it provides a platform for a widening
array of emerging industries, including cloud computing,3
the Internet of Things (IoT),4 big data,5 social media,6 and
1. See JAMES MANYIKA & CHARLES ROXBURGH, MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., THE
GREAT TRANSFORMER: THE IMPACT OF THE INTERNET ON ECONOMIC GROWTH
AND PROSPERITY 1 (2011), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/McKinsey/
Industries/Technology%20Media%20and%20Telecommunications/High
%20Tech/Our%20Insights/The%20great%20transformer/MGI_Impact_
of_Internet_on_economic_growth.ashx (stating that “the Internet accounts
for, on average, 3.4 percent of GDP across the large economies that make up
70 percent of global GDP”); World Stats, INTERNET WORLD STATS, https://
www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2019) (estimating
that there are roughly 4.5 billion global Internet users as of June 30, 2019,
accounting for about fifty-nine percent of the world’s population).
2. According to one estimate, enhanced productivity and lower trading
costs resulted in an increase of 3.4 to 4.8% in U.S. GDP. Digital Trade in the
U.S. and Global Economies, Part 2, Inv. No. 332-540, USITC Pub. 4485, at 16
(Aug. 2014).
3. Cloud computing is “a way of providing [information technology]
functions such as information storage, processing power and computer
programmes as services over the internet, through the usage of external
(often remote) servers”; some of the most common cloud services are emails, file-hosting services, and music and photo services. KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM [NATIONAL BOARD OF TRADE], HOW BORDERLESS IS THE CLOUD? 3
(2012).
4. See Stacy-Ann Elvy, Contracting in the Age of the Internet of Things: Article
2 of the UCC and Beyond, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 839, 840 (2016) (defining the
IoT broadly as a network of connected devices that collect, store, communicate, and transmit information to each other and associated systems).
5. Big data refers to large and complex data sets that are “difficult to
process using on-hand database management tools and traditional data
processing applications.” Borko Furht & Flavio Villanustre, Introduction to Big
Data, in BIG DATA TECHNOLOGIES AND APPLICATIONS 3, 3 (Borko Furht &
Flavio Villanustre eds., 2016). Big data finds widespread applications in numerous industries, including media and entertainment, healthcare, life science, transportation, logistics, retails, utilities, and telecommunications.
Furht & Villanustre, supra at 9.
6. The use of social media has exploded in recent years. For example, as
of 2013, nine in ten Americans ages thirteen to seventeen used Facebook,
making it the most popular social media site. Social Media Explosion: Do Social
Networking Sites Threaten Privacy Rights?, 23 CQ RESEARCHER 81, 85 (2013).
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app-based sharing services.7
Aside from its impact on the general economy, the Internet has revolutioned trade, especially trade across national
borders. Firms increasingly use the Internet to facilitate sale
transactions for goods or services that still need to be delivered
physically.8 Certain goods or services that used to be delivered
physically are now being delivered via the Internet, obviating
the need for the physical movement of goods or service providers.9 The Internet has also transformed the production process, with digital data, instead of unfinished parts or products,
moving across national borders.10 Finally, digital technologies
have created demands for trade in digital goods or services
that did not exist prior to the Internet.11 In accordance with
convention, this article defines all these forms of trade in
which digital data plays a dominant role as digital trade.12
The rise of digital trade has elevated the importance of
digital data to today’s economy. According to one estimate, total cross-border data flow increased eighteen-fold from 2005 to
7. Smartphone-based apps such as Uber and Airbnb have spawned the
“sharing economy,” where providers and consumers of services are connected through Internet-based devices across the globe. See ARUN SUNDARARAJAN, THE SHARING ECONOMY: THE END OF EMPLOYMENT AND THE RISE
OF CROWD-BASED CAPITALISM 2–3 (2016).
8. According to one survey, in 2012, firms in certain digitally intensive
industries in the United States conducted $638.8 billion worth of sales transactions for goods or services that are delivered physically or in person. Digital Trade in the U.S. and Global Economies, Part 2, supra note 2, at 39.
9. Examples of such goods or services include books and audio-visual
products, which are increasingly delivered digitally. In 2012, about one-third
of the online sales by firms in certain digitally intensive industries in the
United States consisted of goods or services delivered over the internet. Id.
10. See ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d
1283, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (addressing a dispute in which the defendant
transmitted digital models of patients’ tooth positions from its subsidiary in
Pakistan to the United States to manufacture tooth aligners).
11. An example of these new goods and services can be found in the IoT
industry, wherein companies sell internet-enabled devices to consumers and
routinely offer ongoing services to them. See Elvy, supra note 4, at 840–41,
845, 847 (describing examples of internet-enabled products that provide
ongoing services).
12. The U.S. International Trade Commission defines digital trade as
“U.S. domestic commerce and international trade in which the Internet and
Internet-based technologies play a particularly significant role in ordering,
producing, or delivering products and services.” Digital Trade in the U.S.
and Global Economies, Part 2, supra note 2, at 29.
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2012.13 In 2014, data flows accounted for U.S. $2.8 trillion of
global GDP.14 Data is now considered to have replaced oil as
“the world’s most valuable resource,”15 and has become “the
lifeblood of the global information economy.”16
While digital trade has had a tremendous impact on international trade, international trade law has not been able to
keep up with the emerging technology. The primary body of
law governing international trade—the law of the World
Trade Organization (WTO)—is still moored in a pre-digital
setup that is becoming increasingly irrelevant to the digital
economy.17 Since 1998, members of the WTO have been engaged in negotiations on digital trade (or “electronic commerce,” to use the official parlance) under the auspices of the
Work Programme on Electronic Commerce (Work Programme).18 But the Work Programme has been bogged down
by ideological and policy differences among WTO members
over a number of issues, particularly the way in which certain
digital products should be incorporated into the existing WTO
legal framework.19 In January 2019, seventy-six WTO members, including all of the major trading nations and regions—
the United States, the European Union, Japan, and China—
13. JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., GLOBAL FLOWS IN A DIGAGE 1 (2014), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/featur
ed%20insights/Globalization/Global%20flows%20in%20a%20digital%20
age/MGI%20Global%20flows%20in%20a%20digial%20age%20Executive%
20summary.ashx.
14. JAMES MANYIKA ET AL., MCKINSEY GLOB. INST., DIGITAL GLOBALIZATION:
THE NEW ERA OF GLOBAL FLOWS 10 (2016), https://www.mckinsey.com/~/
media/McKinsey/Business%20Functions/McKinsey%20Digital/Our%20Ins
ights/Digital%20globalization%20The%20new%20era%20of%20global%20
flows/MGI-Digital-globalization-Full-report.ashx.
15. The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, But Data, ECONOMIST (May 6, 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/theworlds-most-valuable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data.
16. William J. Drake, World Econ. Forum, Background Paper for the Workshop on Data Localization and Barriers to Transborder Data Flows 2 (Sept. 14–15,
2016).
17. See infra Part I (discussing the challenges of adapting the WTO regime to digital trade).
18. See infra pp. 16–17.
19. See generally General Council, Work Programme on Electronic Commerce,
WTO Doc. WT/L/274 (adopted Sept. 25, 1998) [hereinafter Work Programme] (allowing for ideological and policy differences to impact specific
issues that are to be “examined”).
ITAL

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\52-2\NYI204.txt

2020]

unknown

Seq: 5

24-FEB-20

CHALLENGE TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

15:33

543

agreed to restart negotiations on a new framework for digital
trade.20 After two decades, the world trading community has
made no meaningful progress on a legal framework for ditigal
trade and is in desperate need of new ideas.
This article takes stock of the challenges that digital trade
poses to international trade law and offers potential solutions
to those challenges. The article proceeds in four parts. Part I
discusses the difficulties, both conceptually and practically,
with applying existing international trade law to digital trade.
Part II reviews the current approaches to digital trade, including the WTO’s kicking-the-can-down-the-road approach and
the patchwork approach reflected in bilateral and regional
free-trade agreements. Part III analyzes the world trading community’s options in the ongoing digital trade negotiations and
explains why now is not a good time for ambitious action on
the issue. Part IV advocates for a back-to-basics approach to
digital trade. It argues that instead of undertaking far-reaching
negotiations on controversial issues, the world trading community should focus on negotiating basic framework rules and applying widely accepted, existing WTO legal principles to digital trade. This consensus-building approach would best advance the multilateral agenda on digital trade.
II. THE LEGAL CHALLENGES

OF

DIGITAL TRADE

Digital trade poses a number of challenges to the law that
is supposed to regulate it. Such challenges can be grouped
into two categories: conceptual and practical. Before proceeding, a discussion of these challenges is in order.
A. Conceptual Challenges
Digital trade creates a significant issue for international
trade law in that it does not fit easily within the conceptual
categories of the latter. International trade law, which consists
primarily of the law of the WTO, operates within mutually ex20. Leika Kihara, Nearly Half WTO Members Agree to Talks on New E-Commerce Rules, REUTERS, Jan. 25, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/davosmeeting-ecommerce/davos-nearly-half-wto-members-agree-to-talks-on-new-ecommerce-rules-idUSL3N1ZP329.
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clusive categories of “goods” and “services.”21 Under WTO law,
trade in goods is governed by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT),22 which was updated in 1994 under
Annex 1A to the umbrella Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization (WTO Agreement) as one of the “Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods.”23 By contrast, trade in
services is governed by the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS),24 which is the only agreement under a separate annex to the WTO Agreement.25 The classification of a
certain item as a good or service directly affects which WTO
agreement applies and what legal protections are available.26
But what exactly is it that distinguishes goods from services for WTO legal purposes? WTO law gives no helpful answers to this question. Although the distinction between goods
and services is essential under WTO law, the relevant WTO
agreements offer no definitions of the two terms. The GATT,
while being categorized as an agreement on trade in goods,
does not even use the term goods at all.27 Instead, it uses the
more neutral sounding term “product.”28 Similarly, the GATS
offers no definitions of the term “services,” other than stating,
circularly, that “ ‘services’ includes any service in any sector ex21. Nivedita Sen, Understanding the Role of the WTO in International Data
Flows: Taking the Liberalization or the Regulatory Autonomy Path?, 21 J. INT’L
ECON. L. 323, 327 (2018).
22. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61. Stat. A11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
23. Multilateral Agreements on Trade in Goods, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A,
1867 U.N.T.S. 187.
24. General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1869
U.N.T.S. 183 [hereinafter GATS].
25. For illustration of this, see generally Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154.
26. A goods classification would trigger all of the legal protections afforded by the GATT, while a service classification would only trigger legal
protections for services for which member states have made specific commitments under the GATS. Stewart A. Baker et al., E-Products and the WTO, 35
INT’L LAW. 5, 7 (2001); Sam Fleuter, The Role of Digital Products Under the
WTO: A New Framework for GATT and GATS Classification, 17 CHI. J. INT’L L.
153, 156 & n.9 (2016);.
27. For evidence of this, see generally GATT, supra note 22.
28. See, e.g., id. art. I:1 (“With respect to . . . any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party to any product originating
in or destined for any other country . . . .”) (emphasis added).
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cept services supplied in the exercise of governmental authority.”29
The lack of formal definitions notwithstanding, common
usage does provide some basic understandings of what are
goods and what are services for WTO legal purposes. One distinction often applied is that goods are tangible while services
are not.30 In one dispute settlement proceeding, Canada—Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, the WTO Appellate Body
partially endorsed this distinction by holding that an excise tax
by Canada on split-run editions of periodicals containing advertisements primarily directed at the Canadian market was
not subject to the GATS because the editorial and advertising
contents of the periodicals “combine to form a physical product—the periodical itself.”31
There are no easy ways, however, to fit digital products32
on the goods-services dichotomy on the basis of tangibility. On
one hand, digital products are not tangible in the way traditional goods are. But on the other hand, the creation, transmission, and storage of digital products all require physical
media or devices.33 Digital products, therefore, are less tangible than traditional goods, but more tangible than traditional
services. Further militating against a one-size-fits-all service
classification for digital products is the fact that some digital
products have physical counterparts—e.g., digital music, movies, and software that are or can be delivered on physical media, such as CDs. For these so-called “e-products,”34 an illogical
outcome would result if they were classified as services when
29. GATS, supra note 24, art. I:3(b).
30. See Baker et al., supra note 26, at 9 (discussing differing frameworks
that both acknowledge that goods are tangible while services are not). This
distinction is implicitly adopted by Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, which defines goods as “all things . . . moveable.” U.C.C. § 2-105(1)
(AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
31. Appellate Body Report, Canada—Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, at 17, WTO Doc. WT/DS31/AB/R (adopted July 30, 1997).
32. To avoid prejudgment, this article uses the neutral term digital products to refer to digital items that could be classified as either digital goods or
digital services.
33. See Sen, supra note 21, at 326 (describing the transmission of data
across borders and associated restrictions).
34. See Baker et al., supra note 26, at 6 (defining e-products as “contentbased products that formerly were delivered in tangible form but now can be
delivered in electronic form via Internet download”).
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their physical counterparts are classified as goods, as the two,
in all likelihood, are “like products.”35
The complexities surrounding digital products’ tangibility
call for a more nuanced approach to their classification. For
one, the WTO’s “Harmonized Commodity Description and
Coding System” allows WTO member countries to classify electricity—which resembles digital products in form, or lack
thereof—as an “intangible good.”36 But consensus has been
hard to reach for the classification of digital products, as is
evident in the debates between the United States and the European Communities at the WTO on the proper classification
of e-products.37
If tangibility does not set goods apart from services, what
does? Economist Peter Hill proposes an alternative “entity”
theory for the goods-services distinction.38 According to Hill,
“[t]he essential characteristics of a good are that it is an entity
35. In determining whether products are “like,” WTO law requires consideration of the following factors: (i) physical properties of the products;
(ii) the extent to which the products are capable of serving the same or
similar end-uses; (iii) the extent to which the consumers perceive and treat
the products as alternative means of performing particular functions in order to satisfy a particular want or demand; and (iv) the international classification of the products for tariff purposes. Appellate Body Report, European
Communities—Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, ¶
101, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001).
36. Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, Outstanding WTO Issues and Deliverables
with Respect to the Electronic Cross-Border Trade of Digital Products 21
n.67, 23 (Oct. 19, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), https://
www.alexandria.unisg.ch/16160/1/WTO-DigProd.pdf. The European Communities had insisted that electricity should be classified as a good for WTO
law purposes. Wunsch-Vincent, supra at 20.
37. At the WTO Work Programme, the United States argued that a distinction should be made between the transmission of e-products, which is a
service, and the e-products themselves, which are goods. Submission by the
United States, Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, at 5, WTO Doc. WT/
GC/16 (Feb. 12, 1999) [hereinafter Work Programme Submission by the United
States]. The European Communities, however, argued that e-products
should be classified as services. Communication from the European Communities and their Member States, Preparation for the 1999 Ministerial Conference—WTO Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/
306, ¶ 1 (Aug. 9, 1999).
38. See generally Peter Hill, Tangibles, Intangibles and Services: A New Taxonomy for the Classification of Output, 32 CAN. J. ECON. 426 (1999) (discussing the
proposed distinction between goods and services based on their respective
statuses as entitities and their relationship to producers).
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over which ownership rights may be established and from
which its owner(s) derives some economic benefit.”39 Specifically, “[a] good is an entity that exists independently of its
owner and preserves its identity through time.”40 These entities do not have to be tangible; there are intangible entities
“originally produced as outputs by persons, or enterprises, engaged in creative or innovative activities of a literary, scientific,
engineering, artistic or entertainment nature.”41 By contrast,
“a service is not an entity that can exist independently of its
producer or consumer.”42 Under this classification scheme,
some digital products like e-products would be considered intangible goods, although the classification of many other digital products would remain unclear.43
B. Practical Challenges
Besides posing challenges to the goods-services distinction, digital trade also creates practical difficulties for the application of international trade law. The two primary practical
difficulties are the inadequacy of the GATS in dealing with
trade in digitally delivered services, and the lack of specific legal provisions on various barriers to digital trade.
1. GATS
A major practical challenge that digital trade poses is that
the WTO’s foundational agreement governing trade in services—the GATS—is ill equipped to deal with digitally delivered services. As Joshua Meltzer points out, “WTO rules were
largely designed for a world where international trade was in
39. Id. at 437.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 438.
42. Id. at 441.
43. For example, it is not clear how videos on demand would be classified under Hill’s scheme. On one hand, the digital files of such videos are
intangible entities that are capable of being owned, but on the other hand,
the streaming of such videos is necessarily consumed in single use and cannot be stocked. Such products, therefore, have attributes of both goods and
services as defined by Hill. See Baker et al., supra note 26, at 9 (“[E]-products
that can be owned, including books, music, and video, constitute goods. Increasingly however, suppliers are offering e-products—such as the ability to
watch video on demand—that look more like Hill’s services.”).
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physical goods and services delivered in person.”44 The failure
of the Work Programme led to missed opportunities to adapt
WTO rules, particularly the GATS, to services delivered on the
Internet.
The mismatch between the GATS and digitally delivered
services is due, first and foremost, to the very structure of the
GATS. Unlike the GATT, whose obligations apply to all goods,
the market access and national treatment obligations under
the GATS apply only to service sectors specified in a WTO
member’s “Schedule of Commitments,” the document in
which members undertake specific commitments.45 The classification of service sectors under the GATS is mutually exclusive, meaning that a service can be classified only under one
sector.46 But many digitally delivered services are multifunctional in nature. Take WeChat, a popular Chinese smartphone
app, for example. It is an integrated platform that provides
many different kinds of services: social media, instant messaging, payments, online shopping, and so on.47 Take Google for
another example. It combines Internet search services for
users with online advertising services for advertisers.48 Under
the current structure of the GATS, a digital platform like
WeChat or Google cannot be simultaneously classified under
computer and related services, telecommunications services,
44. JOSHUA MELTZER, THE INTERNET, CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS AND INTRADE 13 (Brookings Inst., Issues in Tech. Innovation Ser. No.
22, 2013), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/inter
net-data-and-trade-meltzer.pdf.
45. GATS, supra note 24, arts. XVI:1, XVII:1.
46. Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶ 172, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/
R (adopted Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter AB Report in US—Gambling]. This is
the case because otherwise, the market access and national treatment commitments for each of the multiple service sectors that a service would be
classified under might conflict with one another. AB Report in US—Gambling,
supra at 61 n.219.
47. Mohit Mittal, WeChat—The One App That Rules Them All, HARV. BUS.
SCH. DIGITAL INITIATIVE, https://digital.hbs.edu/innovation-disruption/we
chat%E2%80%8A-%E2%80%8Athe-one-app-rules (last visited Nov. 12,
2019).
48. Sen, supra note 21, at 334; see also Giacomo Luchetta, Is the Google
Platform a Two-Sided Market? 10 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 185, 186 (2014)
(“[Google] leveraged a new search algorithim that delivered much more accurate results, the famous PageRank system, and a new business model based
on advertising.”).
TERNATIONAL
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and advertising services categories, under all of which they
rightly belong.49 Furthermore, under the GATS, the supply of
services in each service sector is categorized into four different
modes: cross-border supply of services (mode one), consumption of services abroad (mode two), commercial presence
(mode three), and movement of natural persons (mode
four).50 The market access and national treatment commitments for each mode of supply are typically different.51 But
when a web user consumes a digital service by accessing a
server located in a foreign country, is the service being delivered by the foreign service provider across the border, therefore falling under mode one, or is the web user virtually traveling abroad to consume the service, making this a mode two
supply of services? Questions like this have no straightforward
answers, as the distinctions between the modes of supply are
quite “artificial” for digitally delivered services.52 In sum, “[a]s
neither the internet nor data flows are always a ‘sector’ or a
mode of delivery, current GATS architecture represents a systemic problem.”53
Given that it is necessary to choose only one service sector
for a specific service, the task of classifying digitally delivered
services is made more difficult by the outdated nature of the
classification system that the GATS uses. The preferred classification system of the GATS—commonly referred to by its official WTO document number, W/120—closely tracks the U.N.
Provisional Central Product Classification (CPC).54 This classi49. Andrew D. Mitchell & Neha Mishra, Data at the Docks: Modernizing International Trade Law for the Digital Economy, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1073,
1090 (2018).
50. Id. at 1088.
51. See, e.g., Aaditya Mattoo & Sacha Wunsch, Pre-empting Protectionism in
Services: The WTO and Outsourcing 15 (World Bank, Policy Research Working
Paper Series, Paper No. 3237, 2004), http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/742751468761428347/pdf/WPS3237.pdf (explaining that
GATS commitments tend to be “more liberal” for services under mode two
than those under mode one).
52. Susannah Hodson, Applying WTO and FTA Disciplines to Data Localization Measures, WORLD TRADE REV. 1, 11 (2018), https://doi.org/10.1017/
S1474745618000277.
53. Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, Cross-Border Data Flows in the Post-Bali Agenda, in
BUILDING ON BALI: A WORK PROGRAMME FOR THE WTO 163, 164 (Simon J.
Evenett & Alejandro Jara eds., 2013).
54. See AB Report in US—Gambling, supra note 46, ¶ 172 (“The right column [of document W/120] is entitled ‘CORRESPONDING CPC’and sets
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fication system has not been updated for almost three decades
and “does not adequately represent business sectors of a digital economy.”55 Particularly, the CPC-based W/120 classification system “do[es] not include categories for new online services industries such as web search engines, mobile applications and cloud computing.”56 As a result, it is not easy to
identify the most appropriate service sectors in the W/120 system for such Internet-based services. For instance, are video
streaming services “audiovisuals” or value-added “telecommunications”? Are cloud-computing services “telecommunications” or “data base services”?57 Or are these services new sectors and thus outside of the scope of W/120 altogether?58
These are not just technical questions, but political ones, as
nations naturally prefer classifications that are favorable to
their industries. The European Union, for example, takes the
position that most digital services should be classified as “audiovisuals,” but that is largely because the European Union does
not have substantial commitments with respect to audiovisual
services.59 There is also a development divide on these classification issues: “[D]eveloping coutries tend to argue that serout, for nearly every subsector listed in the left-hand column, a CPC number
to which that subsector corresponds. It is not disputed that the reference in
W/120 to ‘CPC’ is a reference to the United Nations’ Provisional Central
Product Classification.”).
Although WTO members are not required to use W/120 in their GATS
schedules, the structure and language of a GATS schedule is presumed to
follow the W/120 and CPC nomenclature. See Panel Report, United States—
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, ¶¶
482, 484, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/R (adopted Apr. 20, 2005) [hereinafter
Panel Report in US—Gambling] (stating that the United States was entitled to
not refer to the CPC in its schedule, but finding that the terms of the U.S.
Schedule “should be read in light of W/120, including the CPC references”).
55. Mitchell & Mishra, supra note 49, at 1090.
56. MELTZER, supra note 44, at 15.
57. Sen, supra note 21, at 333.
58. See ROLF H. WEBER & MIRA BURRI, CLASSIFICATION OF SERVICES IN THE
DIGITAL ECONOMY 47 (2012) (“If a service is not listed [in a GATS schedule],
it is not subject to either market access or national treatment commitments . . . .”); see also Lee Tuthill & Martin Roy, GATS Classification Issues for
Information and Communication Technology Services, in TRADE GOVERNANCE IN
THE DIGITAL AGE 157, 167 (Mira Burri & Thomas Cottier eds., 2012) (noting
that “computer services” no longer appears in the CPC Version 2, and instead are “scattered across different sub-sectors of business”).
59. Sen, supra note 21, at 333.
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vices such as Facebook or Google are ‘new services’ and
outside the scope of the W/120, while most developed countries argue to the contrary.”60
2. Barriers to Digital Trade
Another practical challenge that digital trade poses is that
there are no specific legal provisions in the WTO agreements
on the various barriers to digital trade. Barriers to digital trade
take many forms, including both tariff and non-tariff barriers.
Tariff barriers are less of an issue, for now, as the WTO has
imposed a series of moratoriums on customs duties on crossborder electronic transmissions amid uncertainties about how
the multilateral tariff rules would apply to such digital trade.61
The practicality of such moratoriums, however, is “questionable,” as it is difficult to distinguish between cross-border and
domestic data transmissions.62 Indeed, this moratorium has already been violated by at least one country: Indonesia, which is
“reportedly moving forward with plans to impose duties on
digital products such as digital music, e-books, and apps.”63
The more pervasive barriers to digital trade are non-tariff
in nature.64 Arguably, the most significant non-tariff barriers
to digital trade are the so-called data localization measures,
which “specifically limit or prohibit the transfer of data across
country borders.”65 According to one estimate, the number of
data localization measures worldwide ballooned from one in
1960 to eighty-four in 2016.66 There are different types of data
localization measures, depending on the nature of restrictions
that they impose. Some measures require local storage of data,
forcing businesses to establish local data centers.67 Some other
60.
61.
62.
63.

Mitchell & Mishra, supra note 49, at 1091.
See infra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
Lee-Makiyama, supra note 53, at 163.
AMBASSADOR ROBERT E. LIGHTHIZER, OFFICE OF U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, 2018 NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE REPORT ON FOREIGN TRADE BARRIERS
256 (2018) [NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE].
64. See Mitchell & Mishra, supra note 49, at 1091 (“The majority of restrictions on Internet-based services are not customs duties but regulatory measures affecting data flows into and out of the borders of the country . . . .”).
65. Global Digital Trade 1: Market Opportunities and Key Foreign Trade
Restrictions, Inv. No. 332-561, USITC Pub. 4716, at 277 (2014).
66. Id. at 414–15.
67. For example, Indonesia “requires providers of a ‘public service’ to
establish local data centers and disaster recovery centers in Indonesia.” NA-
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measures require both storage and processing of data to be
done locally.68 Yet other measures specifically limit the export
of data.69 These data localization measures dramatically alter
the fundamental architecture of the Internet by forcing businesses to make data decisions based not on efficiency, but on
territorial boundaries.70
Besides data localization measures, other non-tariff barriers to digital trade also restrict free flow of commerce on the
Internet. These measures, primarily focused on data protection and privacy, restrict digital trade through increased administrative and compliance costs. Notable examples of such
measures include the E.U. General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)71 and the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC) Privacy Framework.72
Due to the relative newness of digital trade, existing WTO
rules are not well equipped to deal with these emerging barriers to digital trade. The current WTO framework, as embodied
in the 1994 Uruguay Round agreements, was negotiated prior
to the digital boom that redefined the world economy.73 It is
not surprising, therefore, that there are often no specific legal
TIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE, supra note 63, at 254. Nigeria requires “all foreign
and domestic businesses to store all data concerning Nigerian citizens in
Nigeria.” NATIONAL TRADE ESTIMATE, supra note 63, at 345.
68. China’s newly enacted Cybersecurity Law and its implementing regulations “impose local data storage and processing requirements on companies in ‘critical information infrastructure sectors.’ ” Id. at 105. Russian law
“requires any company collecting personal data of Russian citizens through
automated or computerized means to store and process the data on Russian
territory.” Id. at 400.
69. For example, Korea imposes restrictions on the export of cartographic and other location-based data. Id. at 301. Turkey also “limits transfers of personal data out of Turkey.” Id. at 458.
70. See Gordon M. Goldstein, The End of the Internet?, ATLANTIC (July
2014). https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/07/the-endof-the-internet/372301 (warning that data localization may lead to a fragmentation of the Web, and as a result, “the era of a global Internet may be
passing.”).
71. Regulation (EU) 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 27 April 2016 on the Protection of Natural Persons with Regard
to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data
and Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation),
2016 O.J. (L 119/1).
72. For an introduction to the APEC Privacy Framework, see generally
ASIA-PAC. ECON. COOPERATION, PRIVACY FRAMEWORK (2005).
73. Sen, supra note 21, at 331.
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provisions on point when it comes to challenging a particular
digital trade barrier. For example, there are no provisions in
any of the WTO agreements that specifically address data localization, a major issue in digital trade.74 Without new WTO
agreements on this issue, any legal solutions will have to come
from new interpretations of the existing rules. This will create
“significant ambiguity” in the event of a dispute.75
III. CURRENT APPROACHES

TO

DIGITAL TRADE

While digital trade has grown in leaps and bounds in the
last two decades, international trade law has lagged behind.
Despite efforts at the WTO to tackle digital trade since 1998,
controversies, delays, and non-decisions have marred the multilateral process. More progress has been made on digital
trade through bilateral and regional free-trade agreements
(FTAs), but reliance on FTAs has led to inconsistent and fragmented rules.
A. The Kicking-the-Can-Down-the-Road Approach
The world trading community has recognized the importance of digital trade since it emerged. Unfortunately, decades
later, it still has not figured out a coherent solution to the puzzle of how digital trade fits into the international legal framework governing world trade.
Dating back to as far as the 1970s, efforts were underway
to study the potential impact of cross-border data flow. A major player that spearheaded such efforts was the Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which,
in 1974, coined the term “transborder data flow” and raised
the question of whether it “constituted a problem sufficiently
important in its implications for national sovereignty for governments to propose regulatory action.”76 The OECD then
formed the “Working Party on Transborder Data Flows” to
study the potential effects of corporate transborder data flows
on the sovereignty of nation-states.77 In 1980, the OECD
74. Hodson, supra note 52, at 5.
75. Id.
76. Hans-Peter Gassman & G. Russell Pipe, Synthesis Report, in POLICY ISSUES IN DATA PROTECTION AND PRIVACY 12, 27 (Org. for Econ. Cooperation &
Dev., Informatics Studies No. 10, 1976).
77. Drake, supra note 16, at 5.
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adopted “Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data,” which set out principles governing the collection and use of personal data.78 These early
efforts by the OECD, however, focused not on international
trade, but on data protection and personal privacy.
In the early 1980s, the OECD began to shift its attention
to the broader economic, legal, and social impact of transborder data flows; however, the global business community
and key countries such as the United States pushed back and
opposed aggressive interventionist measures.79 In the end,
OECD’s efforts to regulate transborder data flows were largely
thwarted, with the publication of a 1985 document whose only
accomplishment was the enunciation of certain minimalist,
nonbinding goals.80
The establishment of the WTO in 1994 did little to address the emerging digital trade issue. Only in a very limited
fashion do the WTO agreements specifically address digital
trade. For instance, the WTO Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services provides that “[n]o Member shall
take measures that prevent transfers of information or the
processing of financial information, including transfers of data
by electronic means.”81 In addition, the GATS Annex on Telecommunications requires WTO member countries to ensure
that “services suppliers of any other Member may use public
telecommunications transport networks and services for the
movement of information within and across borders . . . . and
for access to information contained in data bases or otherwise
stored in machine-readable form in the territory of any Member.”82 These rules, however, only apply to their respective sectors: financial services and telecommunications.
78. Id. at 6.
79. Id. at 6–8.
80. Id. at 8. This document listed goals that included: avoidance of “creation of unjustified barriers to international exchange of data,” “transparency
in regulations and policies relating to . . . transborder data flows,” and commitments to “[c]onsider possible implications for other countries when dealing with . . . transborder data flows.” Id. at 8.
81. Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services, art. B(8),
Apr. 15, 1994, Legal Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, App. 4, 33
I.L.M. 1125.
82. GATS, supra note 24, Annex on Telecommunications, art. 5(c). The
only exception to this requirement is that “a Member may take such measures as are necessary to ensure the security and confidentiality of messages,
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It was not until 1998 that the world trading community
attempted to tackle digital trade in a systematic manner. In
1998, the WTO General Council established the Work Programme on Electronic Commerce (Work Progamme), a comprehensive work program examining “all trade-related issues
relating to global electronic commerce.”83 The Work Programme takes a broad view of electronic commerce84 and
charges four WTO entities—the Council on Trade in Goods,
the Council on Trade in Services, the Trade Related Intellectual Property Rights Council, and the Committee on Trade
and Development—to “explore the relationship between existing WTO agreements and e-commerce.”85
Despite a promising start, ideological and political differences among WTO members have prevented meaningful progress at the Work Programme.86 So far, five dedicated discussions on electronic commerce have been held under the auspices of the General Council.87 The topics discussed at the
dedicated discussions were wide ranging, including classification of e-products; fiscal implications of electronic commerce;
the relationship between electronic commerce and traditional
commerce; customs duties on electronic commerce; competition; jurisdiction; and applicable laws in electronic commerce.88 Negotiations on the classification of e-products, however, deadlocked these five dedicated discussions.89 Because of
the diametrically opposed positions of the proponents of a
subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
or a disguised restriction on trade in services.” GATS, supra note 24, Annex
on Telecommunications, art. 5(d).
83. Work Programme, supra note 19, ¶ 1.1.
84. See id. at ¶ 1.3 (defining electronic commerce as “the production,
distribution, marketing, sale or delivery of goods and services by electronic
means”).
85. MC11 in Brief: Electronic Commerce, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.
wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/mc11_e/briefing_notes_e/bfecom_e.
htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
86. Mitchell & Mishra, supra note 49, at 1077–78.
87. Electronic Commerce Work Continues on Issues Needing Clarification,
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min
03_e/brief_e/brief15_e.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
88. Id.
89. SACHA WUNSCH-VINCENT, THE WTO, THE INTERNET AND TRADE IN DIGITAL PRODUCTS 173 (2006). For background on e-products, see supra notes
34–35 and accompanying text.
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GATT-like treatment of e-products and those favoring a GATS
classification, there was “a clear gap in perceptions about exactly how the classification issue could be resolved.”90 The impasse on classification negatively affected not only the Work
Programme, but also market access negotiations in the Doha
Development Agenda.91
To date, the only concrete outcome of the Work Programme was the postponement of a final decision on a key
issue: customs duties on electronic transmissions. Amid controversies surrounding the classification of digital products,
the WTO imposed a temporary moratorium on customs duties
on electronic transmissions at the second WTO Ministerial
Conference in Geneva in 1998.92 This moratorium was extended at every subsequent WTO ministerial conference, except one in Seattle in 1999.93 It appears that the WTO is
90. Secretariat, Fifth Dedicated Discussion on Electronic Commerce Under the
Auspices of the General Council on 16 May and 11 July 2003, at 9, WTO Doc.
WT/GC/W/509 (July 31, 2003).
91. WUNSCH-VINCENT, supra note 89, at 173. Because of the uncertainty
surrounding the classification of e-products, WTO member countries had to
negotiate market access for both goods and services. WUNSCH-VINCENT, supra
note 89, at 174.
92. See World Trade Organization, Declaration on Global Electronic
Commerce of 20 May 1998, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(98)/DEC/2, WTO Documents Online, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_
Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=4814,34856,2030
8&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=1&FullTextHash= (last visited Nov. 13, 2019)
(“[W]e also declare that Members will continue their current practice of not
imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions.”).
93. For these extensions, see World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 13 December 2017—Work Programme on Electronic Commerce,
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(17)/65, WTO Documents Online, WORLD TRADE ORG.,
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?filename=Q:/WT/
MIN17/65.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2019); World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 19 December 2015—Work Programme on Electronic
Commerce, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(15)/42, WTO Documents Online, WORLD
TRADE ORG., https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/SS/directdoc.aspx?file
name=Q:/WT/MIN15/42.pdf (last visited Nov. 13, 2019); World Trade Organization, Ministerial Decision of 7 December 2013—Work Programme on
Electronic Commerce, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(13)/32, WTO Documents Online,
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_
S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=225903,121378,44070,76446
&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=1&FullTextHash= (last visited Nov. 13, 2019);
World Trade Organization, Decision of 17 December 2011—Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, WTO Doc. WT/L/843, WTO Documents
Online, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search
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poised to continue kicking the can down the road on this issue.
B. The Patchwork Approach
While the WTO has failed to come up with a coherent set
of rules on digital trade, specific countries have addressed digital trade through FTAs. This approach, however, has produced only patchwork results with no systemic benefits. As described below, the solutions that these FTAs offer are often
contradictory with one another and with WTO rules, creating
serious risks that digital trade will be fragmented, not facilitated.
A major driving force behind the efforts to use FTAs to
expand digital trade was the United States, which, in the early
2000s, pursued a number of bilateral and regional FTAs out of
concern that it was losing out in the FTA race.94 A central goal
of the United States in negotiating those FTAs was to “conclude trade agreements that anticipate and prevent the creation of new trade barriers that may surface in the digital trade
environment.”95 The U.S. digital trade agenda at the time included free trade in e-products and liberalization of services
that could be delivered across borders electronically.96 In the
/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=CatalogueIdList=225903,121378,44070,7
6446&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=2&FullTextHash= (last visited Nov. 13,
2019); World Trade Organization, Decision of 2 December 2009—Work
Programme on Electronic Commerce, WTO Doc. WT/L/782, WTO Documents Online, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_
Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=225903,121378,
44070,76446&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=3&FullTextHash= (last visited Nov.
13, 2019); World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 18 December 2005—Doha Work Programme, ¶ 46, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(05)/DEC,
WTO Documents Online, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/
Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=70196
&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=0&FullTextSearch= (last visited Nov. 13, 2019);
World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, ¶
34, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).
94. Sacha Wunsch-Vincent, The Digital Trade Agenda of the U.S.: Parallel
Tracks of Bilateral, Regional and Multilateral Liberalization, 58 AUSSENWIRTSCHAFT [SWISS REV. INT’L ECON. RELATIONS] 7, 7–8 (2003).
95. Id. at 8.
96. Id. at 8–9.
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end, U.S. efforts culminated in the entry into force of several
FTAs that had a dedicated chapter on electronic commerce.97
Besides the United States, other countries that have
played important roles in tackling digital trade through FTAs
include Australia, Japan, Singapore, and the member states of
the European Union.98 Over time, the inclusion of electronic
commerce provisions in FTAs has become commonplace.99 As
of May 2017, there are seventy-five FTAs that contain explicit
electronic commerce provisions.100 Electronic commerce provisions are found not only in FTAs entered into by developed
countries, but also in FTAs by and among developing countries.101 Electronic commerce provisions are also included in
several high profile FTAs that were recently completed or proposed, including the renegotiated North American Free
Ttrade Agreement,102 the renegotiated U.S.-Korea FTA,103 the

97. These FTAs include the U.S.-Chile FTA, the U.S.-Singapore FTA, and
the U.S.-Australia FTA. MARK WU, RTA EXCH., DIGITAL TRADE-RELATED PROVISIONS IN REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: EXISTING MODELS AND LESSONS FOR
THE MULTILATERAL TRADE SYSTEM 6 (2017), http://e15initiative.org/wp-con
tent/uploads/2015/09/RTA-Exchange-Digital-Trade-Mark-Wu-Final-2.pdf.
98. Mitchell & Mishra, supra note 49, at 1078. The very first FTA with a
dedicated electronic commerce chapter was the Australia-Singapore FTA,
which entered into force in 2003. WU, supra note 97, at 6.
99. For major electronic commerce provisions in FTAs, see Lior Herman, Multilateralising Regionalism: The Case of E-Commerce 12 tbl. 3 (Org. for
Econ. Cooperation & Dev. Trade Policy Papers, Paper No. 99, 2009), http://
dx.doi.org/10.1787/5kmbjx6gw69x-en.
100. José-Antonio Monteiro & Robert Teh, Provisions on Electronic Commerce
in Regional Trade Agreements 4 (World Trade Org. Working Paper No. ERSD2017-11, 2017), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=3005148.
101. Fifteen countries classified as lower-income countries by the World
Bank and thirteen countries classified as upper-middle-income countries
have signed on to FTAs with electronic commerce provisions; additionally,
several countries in Latin America have included electronic commerce provisions in FTAs. WU, supra note 97, at 7–8.
102. Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican States, and Canada, ch. 19, Nov. 30, 2018, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/united-states-mexico-canada-agreement/
agreement-between.
103. The United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, S. Kor.-U.S., ch. 15,
June 30, 2007, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/
korus-fta/final-text.
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Trans-Pacific Partnership,104 the Trade in Services Agreement,105 and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership.106
The push for digital trade through FTAs, however, comes
at a price: The digital trade provisions of the various FTAs differ in terms of coverage and requirements, creating a fragmented legal landscape for digital trade. Some FTAs take a
barebone approach to digital trade, and go no further than
prohibiting customs duties on electronic transactions and expressing a willingness to cooperate among regulatory authorities.107 Some other FTAs, however, contain “deep integration”
or “WTO plus” provisions that extend existing WTO rules to
new trade areas or expand commitments in areas already covered by WTO agreements.108 Variations exist among the FTAs
of different countries due to different ideologies and policy
preferences.109 Particularly, FTAs initiated by the United
States and Japan tend to be more liberalizing than those
adopted by the European Union, and FTAs signed by China
“tend to avoid complex regulatory issues such as cross-border
data flows.”110 Variations also exist among the FTAs that the
same countries adopt over time. The early FTAs that the
United States signed, for example, “achieved minimal and geographically limited harmonization” and were “incapable of addressing the key digital trade challenges and of ensuring free
digital flows globally.”111 By contrast, the more recent FTAs
that the United States negotiated have included a broader and
deeper range of issues, such as data localization and cross-border data flows.112
104. Trans-Pacific Partnership, ch. 14, Feb. 4, 2016, https://ustr.gov/
trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-fulltext.
105. The negotiations of the Trade in Services Agreement demonstrate
that demands for digital trade provisions have become common. Mitchell &
Mishra, supra note 49, at 1078.
106. Id.
107. WU, supra note 97, at 6.
108. Herman, supra note 99, at 10.
109. Mitchell & Mishra, supra note 49, at 1086.
110. Id. at 1086–87.
111. Mira Burri, Designing Future-Oriented Multilateral Rules for Digital Trade,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRADE IN SERVICES 331, 347 (Pierre Sauvé & Martin Roy eds., 2016).
112. WU, supra note 97, at 8.
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Regulating digital trade through bilateral or regional
FTAs might, at least initially, be a “second-best option” given
the divides that exist at the multilateral level.113 In new and
controversial areas such as digital trade, FTAs can serve as “experimental laboratories,” providing “guidance and direction
for the ways through which rule-making and liberalisation
commitments can take place multilaterally.”114 Indeed, in
many areas concerning digital trade, a de facto “convergence”
of rules is emerging through FTAs.115
It is also obvious, however, that FTAs alone are not an adequate answer to the challenges for the global trade community in regards to digital trade. The patchwork fixes that the
FTAs provide have to be supplemented by broader international solutions. Othewise, “in the long run, the global framework for digital trade may become fragmented, thereby disrupting the seamless nature of a digital economy.”116 To the
extent that multilateralization cannot be accomplished
through the bottom-up process led by FTAs, there have to be
efforts at the global level to nudge international trade law in
the more uniform, coherent direction. The important question is what efforts will provide the best nudge given the political and institutional constraints under which international
trade law operates.
IV. OPTIONS MOVING FORWARD
In recent years, there has been renewed interest in reviving stalled multilateral negotiations at the WTO. Following the
conclusion of the five dedicated discussions on electronic com113. Herman, supra note 99, at 4.
114. Id. at 6. For instance, high-level principles proposed by the OECD
and the APEC have informed several FTAs such as the Japan-Mongolia Economic Partnership Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement,
and the European Union-Korea FTA. Mitchell & Mishra, supra note 49, at
1108.
115. Herman, supra note 99, at 4. There are “surprisingly” many provisions
that are common to a large number of FTAs; such common provisions address issues such as the definition of digital products, moratorium on customs duties on digital transimissions, a”voiding unnecessary regulatory barriers” to electronic commerce, and cooperation in electronic commerce and
related areas. Herman, supra note 99, at 14–16.
116. Mitchell & Mishra, supra note 49, at 1107.
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merce under the auspices of the WTO General Council,117 discussions on electronic commerce continued throughout 2016
and 2017 in the four WTO bodies charged with carrying out
the Work Programme.118 Since mid-2016, twenty-five submissions have been made to the General Council and relevant
WTO bodies.119 WTO member countries submitted “more focused” position papers in preparation for the 2017 WTO Ministerial Conference.120
Those submissions on electronic commerce addressed a
wide range of issues and featured vastly different approaches.
Some submissions proposed to revisit the classification issue,
the very issue that bogged down the agenda of the Work Programme.121 Some other submissions took a more pragmatic
approach, and advocated for the elimination of customs duties
for all digital products regardless of how they are classified.122
Yet other submissions raised doubts about whether the moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions should
be renewed.123 The United States and Japan, in keeping with
their long-standing policy preferences on digital trade, pro117. See supra note 87 and accompanying text.
118. MC11 in Brief: Electronic Commerce, supra note 85.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. See, e.g., Communication from the Russian Federation, Work Programme on Electronic Commerce—Ways to Move Forward, ¶ 4.4, WTO Doc. JOB/
GC/131 (July 13, 2017) (suggesting that the Working Group on Electronic
Commerce should discuss “basic terminology relating to e-commerce . . . in
order to reach a common understanding”).
122. See, e.g., Non-Paper from the United States, Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, ¶ 2.1, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/94 (July 4, 2016) [hereinafter
Non-Paper from the United States] (suggesting prohibition of digital customs duties as an example of “positive contributions to a flourishing digital
economy”).
123. A submission by a group of African nations states that “in view of the
revenue implications of the current moratorium on customs duties . . . the
renewal of the moratorium should not be seen as automatic.” Communication from the African Group, Work Programme on Electronic Commerce—Draft
Ministerial Decision on Electronic Commerce, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/155 (Nov. 20,
2017). Similarly, India proposed to condition its acceptance of the moratorium on the prohibition of non-violation and situation complaints under the
TRIPs. Communication from India, Work Programme on Electronic Commerce—
Draft Ministerial Decision on Electronic Commerce, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/153
(Nov. 20, 2017).
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posed stringent rules regarding cross-border data flows.124
Some other countries and regions, including the European
Union and Canada, argued that commitments on cross-border
data flows should be subject to appropriate public policy exceptions.125 Submissions from China highlighted the importance of helping small businesses and vulnerable groups to
“better participate in and benefit from international trade and
global value chains.”126
Because of the divergent views and policy positions that
WTO member countries held, efforts to overhaul the multilateral rules on digital trade suffered a setback at the 2017 WTO
Ministerial Conference in Buenos Aires, where member countries failed to consolidate the proposals previously submitted
on electronic commerce.127 After the failure at Buenos Aires, a
group of seventy-one WTO member countries launched an initiative to start “exploratory work together toward future WTO
negotiations on trade-related aspects of electronic commerce.”128 In January 2019, a group of seventy-six countries
124. The United States argued in its submission that “[c]ompanies and
consumers must be able to move data as they see fit.” Non-Paper from the
United States, supra note 122, ¶ 2.3. Japan in its submission contended that
“[t]he free flow of digitally encoded information, which enables both consumers and suppliers to gain the maximum benefits of the digital environment, should be allowed across borders, when this activity is for the conduct
of business.” Non-Paper for the Discussions on Electronic Commerce/Digital Trade from Japan, Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, at 2, WTO Doc.
JOB/GC/100 (July 21, 2016).
125. See Communication from Canada, Chile, Colombia, Côte d’Ivoire,
the European Union, the Republic of Korea, Mexico, Paraguay and Singapore (Revision), Work Programme on Electronic Commerce—Trade Policy, the
WTO, and the Digital Economy, at 5, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/97/Rev.1 (July 22,
2016) (“Building on existing WTO obligations, commitment to ensure that
cross-border data flows is permitted, subject to appropriate public policy exceptions.”).
126. Communication from China, E-Commerce Elements for MC11, ¶ 6.1,
WTO Doc. JOB/GC/142 (Oct. 19, 2017).
127. Luc Cohen & David Lawder, Some WTO Members to Push for E-Commerce
Rules as Broader Deal Fails, REUTERS, Dec. 13, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/
article/us-trade-wto-digital/some-wto-members-to-push-for-e-commercerules-as-broader-deal-fails-idUSKBN1E72YV.
128. World Trade Organization, Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce
on 13 December 2017, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(17)/60, WTO Documents Online,
WORLD TRADE ORG., https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_
S009-DP.aspx?language=E&CatalogueIdList=240862,240867,240868,240870,
240871,240899,240875,240874,240878,240877&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=
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and organizations, including the United States, the European
Union, Japan, and China, agreed to start negotiating a new
framework for electronic commerce.129
So, two decades after the launch of the Work Programme,
the world trading community is again at a cross-roads on digital trade. While the broad agenda that the Work Programme
called for has stalled, there is still some interest, as indicated
by the recent push for new negotiations, in tackling digital
trade at the multilateral level. The key question, though, is
how to best advance the multilateral agenda on digital trade.
One potential way to channel the multilateral efforts on
digital trade is to seize the renewed interest and use it to negotiate new, far-reaching multilateral rules. There have been
plenty of calls from scholars and policymakers to do just that.
For instance, Hosuk Lee-Makiyama argues that a new “horizontal discipline” should be developed for all trade-related aspects of data transfers, whether it relates to trade in goods or
trade in services.130 Andrew Mitchell and Neha Mishra advocate for a new WTO agreement on digital trade that adopts a
“clear, technologically neutral definition of digital products,”makes the moratorium on customs duties on electronic
transmissions permanent, and recognizes all aspects of digital
trade.131 Ziyang Fan, the World Economic Forum’s head of
digital trade, also calls for WTO member countries to agree on
a new set of global electronic commerce guidelines.132
However, given the circumstances under which the world
trading system is currently operating, it is not realistic, and
perhaps not worthwhile, for WTO member countries to expend precious institutional resources to negotiate new multilateral rules on highly controversial issues in digital trade. This
conclusion stems primarily from mounting challenges that are
already facing the WTO. As elaborated below, in the face of
these challenges, attempts to enact sweeping rules on digital
4&FullTextHash=371857150&HasEnglishRecord=True&HasFrenchRecord
=CT (last visited Nov. 13, 2019).
129. Kihara, supra note 20.
130. Lee-Makiyama, supra note 53, at 165.
131. Mitchell & Mishra, supra note 49, at 1127.
132. Karen Gilchrist, WTO Risks Lagging Behind the Fast-Moving Digital Economy, World Economic Forum Official Says, CNBC (Dec. 4, 2018), https://
www.cnbc.com/2018/11/29/wto-failed-on-lack-of-rulesfor-global-e-com
merce-digital-trade.html.
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trade are unlikely to yield meaningful results, and could further divide the already fractured world trading community.
First, it is worth noting that this is a particularly perilous
time for the international trading system. The consensus on
the importance and value of free trade, which was the foundation for the GATT and the WTO, appears to be unraveling.
This unraveling was already underway during the WTO’s Doha
Development Round, which was aimed at lowering trade barriers, addressing unresolved issues from previous negotiating
rounds, and enabling developing countries to share in the
benefits of free trade.133 Despite its lofty goals, the Doha
Round turned out to be “the slowest development round of all
times.”134 Originally scheduled to conclude in 2005, the Doha
Round negotiations “were paralyzed because neither developed economies like the United States and the European
Union nor developing countries like China and India were
willing or able to make fundamental concessions.”135 After
fourteen years of negotiations, trade ministers from more than
one hundred and sixty WTO member countries failed to agree
at the WTO’s tenth Ministerial Conference in Nairobi, Kenya
in December 2017 to continue the Doha Round negotiations,
essentially declaring the end of the Doha Round.136
Furthermore, recent attacks by the United States—a major pillar of the world trading system—on the WTO’s dispute
settlement mechanism have weakened the WTO’s ability to enforce existing trade rules. Historically, the United States was a
major player in international trade, and “dominated the negotiations leading to the WTO’s establishment.”137 Along with
the European Union, the United States was “in the best posi133. Editorial, Global Trade After the Failure of the Doha Round, N.Y. Times
(Jan. 1, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/01/opinion/globaltrade-after-the-failure-of-the-doha-round.html.
134. ANNA E. RICHTER, DOHA DEVELOPMENT ROUND: WHY DID IT FAIL? 7
(2014).
135. Global Trade After the Failure of the Doha Round, supra note 133.
136. Id. Interestingly, the WTO’s official statement on the outcomes of the
Nairobi ministerial conference emphasizes the “historic” package the conference secured for Africa and the world. WTO Members Secure “Historic” Nairobi
Package for Africa and the World, WORLD TRADE ORG., (Dec. 19, 2015), https://
www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/mc10_19dec15_e.htm.
137. Gregory Shaffer, A Tragedy in the Making? The Decline of Law and the
Return of Power in International Trade Relations, 44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 3
(2019).
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tion to shape WTO jurisprudence” due to its “vast legal resources.”138 However, as it began to lose important WTO cases
involving trade remedy measures,139 the United States became
increasingly frustrated by the alleged “overreach” of the WTO
Appellate Body.140 Specifically, the United States was concerned that “the Appellate Body deviated from the treaty text
to create its own standards.”141 This “growing habit of creating
its own rules,” according to the United States, “would usurp
the exclusive role of the sovereign states that had created the
WTO to decide what obligations would apply among themselves.”142
The United States has chosen to express its frustration
with the Appellate Body by disrupting the process for selecting
Appellate Body members. Under the Bush and Obama administrations, the United States twice refused to renominate an
Appellate Body member from the United States and replaced
each with a new member.143 The United States then blocked
the appointment of a member from Kenya and the reappointment of a member from Korea.144 The Trump administration
138. Id. at 3.
139. For example, in 2000, the United States lost a high-stakes dispute in
the US—FSC case, where the Appellate Body “rejected the US argument that
the 1981 Understanding of the GATT Council—an understanding that
paved the way for the FSC tax—constituted an authoritative interpretation
of subsidy obligations under Article XVI:4 of the GATT.” TETYANA PAYOSOVA
ET AL., PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON., THE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT CRISIS IN
THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 4 (2018). Another major loss that the
United States suffered at the WTO in recent years was the WTO’s rejection
of its “zeroing” practice in a series of cases; between 1998 and early 2010,
nearly twenty disputes involving zeroing were adjudicated at the WTO, and
at least twenty-two separate WTO dispute settlement panel and Appellate
Body decisions found the practice of zeroing to be inconsistent with the
WTO Antidumping Agreement. Chad P. Bown & Thomas J. Prusa, U.S. Antidumping: Much Ado About Zeroing 25–26 (World Bank Policy Research Working Papers, Paper No. 5352), http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/
10.1596/1813-9450-5352.
140. PAYOSOVA ET AL., supra note 139, at 3.
141. Dispute Settlement Body, Minutes of Meeting Held in the Centre William
Rappard on 8 March 2002, ¶ 35, WTO Doc. WT/DSB/M/121 (Apr. 3, 2002).
142. Id.
143. Shaffer, supra note 137, at 4.
144. Id. In selecting members of the Appellate Body, the WTO acts “by
consensus.” Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 2(4), Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing
the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter
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has escalated the attacks on the Appellate Body by taking the
unprecedented step of objecting to all motions to nominate or
renew the term of Appellate Body members, potentially closing down the Appellate Body by December 2019.145
Not only did the United States lead the charge against the
Appellate Body, but it also took unilateral steps to impose tariffs on imports in clear circumvention of the multilateral dispute settlement process that the WTO rules envisioned. Notably, the Trump administration initiated a Section 301 investigation into China’s alleged intellectual property abuses,
triggering a tit-for-tat trade war with China.146 The use of Section 301 by the United States was previously the subject of a
WTO dispute settlement proceeding brought by the European
Communities in 1998, and was found by a WTO dispute settlement panel to be consistent with WTO rules only because of
promises from the United States that it would not take actions
under Section 301 that were inconsistent with its WTO obligations.147 This time around, when China challenged it before
the WTO, the United States defended its Section 301 tariffs by
claiming that “the tariffs fall outside the WTO’s remit because
they address trade issues that are not specifically covered
under WTO rules.”148 This argument is curious at best, as the
issue at the core of the Section 301 investigation—China’s
forced technology transfer—is indeed covered by China’s
WTO Accession Protocol149 and is therefore challengeable
DSU]. Consensus is deemed to be present “if no Member, present at the
meeting of the DSB when the decision is taken, formally objects to the proposed decision.” DSU, supra art.2(4) n.1.
145. Rachel Brewster, The Trump Administration and the Future of the WTO,
44 YALE J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 3 (2018). As of October 1, 2018, only three
members of the Appellate Body remained, and only one Appellate Body
member will remain as of December 11, 2019. Shaffer, supra note 137, at 5.
146. Chad P. Bown et al., Trump and China Formalize Tariffs on $260 Billion
of Imports and Look Ahead to Next Phase, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON.:
TRADE & INV. POL’Y WATCH (Sept. 20, 2018), http://piie.com/blogs/tradeinvestment-policy-watch/trump-and-china-formalize-tariffs-260-billion-imports-and-look.
147. Panel Report, United States—Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, ¶
8.1, WTO Doc. WT/DS152/R (adopted Jan. 27, 2000).
148. Bryce Baschuk, Trump’s China Tariffs Likely to Be Investigated by the
WTO, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 27, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-27/trump-s-china-tariffs-likely-to-be-investigated-by-the-wto.
149. See Ministerial Conference, Decision of 10 November 2001: Accession of
the People’s Republic of China, at 5, WTO Doc. WT/L/432 (Nov. 23, 2001)
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before the WTO.150 Using Section 301 in such circumstances
arguably “represents a full-throated rejection of the WTO’s
rule of law norms and a forceful return to the unilateralism
that WTO structures were designed to prevent.”151 In addition,
the Trump administration invoked national security as the justification for a series of tariffs on steel and aluminum imports,
deviating from the restraint that WTO members, the United
States included, had exercised on this issue throughout the
WTO’s history.152 To make matters worse, the Trump administration’s tariffs prompted retaliatory tariffs on U.S. products,
which were imposed without WTO authorization.153
It is against this backdrop that calls for more multilateral
negotiations on digital trade are being made. Referring to digital trade, WTO Director-General Roberto Azevedo once
stated that “it was unacceptable that by 2018 . . . the WTO
won’t have a deeper, more effective conversation about a phenomenon that is driving the global economy today.”154 These
calls, however, ignore a markedly changed reality compared to
two decades ago when the Work Programme was first
launched. As John Jackson has famously argued, the creation
(“Without prejudice to the relevant provisions of this Protocol, China shall
ensure that . . . the right of . . . investment by national and sub-national
authorities, is not conditioned on . . . performance requirements of any
kind, such as . . . the transfer of technology . . . .”).
150. The European Union indeed initiated a WTO dispute settlement
proceeding against China’s forced technology transfer on June 1, 2018. Request for Consultations by the European Union, China—Certain Measures on
the Transfer of Technology, WTO Doc. WT/DS549/1 (June 6, 2018).
151. Brewster, supra note 145, at 4–5.
152. Id. at 5.
153. Shaffer, supra note 137, at 6. Ironically, the United States has challenged the retaliatory tariffs imposed on U.S. products in response to its
steel and aluminum tariffs before the WTO. For the U.S. complaints about
the tariffs imposed by Canada, China, and the European Union, see Request
for Consultations by the United States, Canada—Additional Duties on Certain
Products from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS557/1 (July 19, 2018); Request for Consultations by the United States, China—Additional Duties on Certain Products from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS558/1 (July 19, 2018);
Request for Consultations by the United States, European Union—Additional
Duties on Certain Products from the United States, WTO Doc. WT/DS559/1 (July
19, 2018).
154. Leika Kihara, China and U.S. Among 76 WTO Members Pushing for New
E-Commerce Rules, REUTERS, Jan. 25, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-davos-meeting-ecommerce/china-and-u-s-among-76-wto-members-pushing-for-new-e-commerce-rules-idUSKCN1PJ0UK.
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of the WTO represented a transition from a “power-oriented”
technique to a “rule-oriented” one in international economic
relations.155 This rule-oriented framework appears to be in serious jeopardy now. Amid the apparent return to power struggles in international economic relations, it may not be the best
use of the world trading community’s resources to engage in
difficult rulemaking on controversial ditigal trade issues.
When the world’s major trading partners are locked in disputes that raise doubts about the long-term viability of the
multilateral trading system, negotiations on more controversial rules for digital trade—or any conroverisal matters—are
unlikely to yield meaningful results.156 Furthermore, the differences in idealogy and policy among the major nations are
likely to be amplified in the negotiation process, and may
cause further damage to the already fragile international trading system.
V. BACK

TO

BASICS

Given the challenges facing the WTO and the broader
world trading community, this article contends that the best
way to move forward on digital trade is to stay away from ambitious negotiations on controversial issues, and instead focus on
negotiating basic framework rules and applying widely accepted WTO legal principles to digital trade. As discussed below, the goal of this approach is to seek the “greatest common
divisor” among major trading nations, and to gradually build
consensus towards a more comprehensive legal regime on digital trade.
155. JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 109–11 (2d ed. 1997).
156. It is likely that the new negotiations will lead to plurilateral agreements signed on by some, but not all, countries participating in the negotiations. See James Bacchus, Was Buenos Aires the Beginning of the End or the End of
the Beginning? The Future of the World Trade Organization, CATO INST. (May 8,
2018), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/was-buenos-airesbeginning-end-or-end-beginning-future-world-trade (noting that WTO members appear “ready to turn toward ‘plurilateral’ solutions on trade,” and
describing these solutions as “agreements among some, but not yet all, WTO
members”). Such an outcome, however, would hardly be an improvement
over the current bilateral and regional FTAs. But see Bacchus, supra (suggesting that plurilaterial agreements, which can be “gradually transform[ed]
. . . into fully global agreements,” represent the “most promising path to
multilateralism in the 21st century”).
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International trade law is no stranger to the concept of
using existing legal frameworks and principles to address new
issues. This tendency can be seen in the WTO’s treatment of
the classification of digital products. As discussed earlier,
whether digital products, particularly digitally delivered contents (i.e., e-products), should be classified as goods or services
has been a challenging issue holding back the WTO’s digital
trade agenda.157 In light of the difficulties with classifying digital products, some commentators have proposed abandoning
the traditional dichotomy between goods and services and
adopting a sui generis approach. For instance, Althaf Marsoof
makes the case for treating software as neither goods nor services, but intellectual property products that are governed by
the Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) Agreement.158 Similarly, Mosuk Lee-Makiyama proposes that digital products be governed by an expanded Information Technology Agreement.159 Proposals from WTO member countries reflect this sui generis approach.160
Although the WTO has not arrived at a consensus on the
classification issue, it has generally rejected this sui generis approach.161 The reason for this is not hard to understand.
While it is obvious that the WTO’s legal framework was not
157. See supra Part I(A) for discussion of the classification of e-products.
158. Althaf Marsoof, A Case for Sui Generis Treatment of Software Under the
WTO Regime, 20 INT’L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 291, 306–07 (2012). Marsoof acknowledges, however, that the TRIPS Agreement does not contain market
access disciplines, as it “[is] not seen as a forum for trade liberalization as in
GATT and GATS.” Marsoof, supra at 307.
159. Hosuk Lee-Makiyama, Future-Proofing World Trade in Technology: Turning the WTO IT Agreement (ITA) into the International Digital Economy Agreement
(IDEA) 7–10 (Eur. Ctr. for Int’l Political Econ. Working Paper No. 04/2011,
2011), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/inftec_e/symp_may12_e/
lee_makiyama_e.pdf.
160. See, e.g., Communication from Indonesia and Singapore, Preparations
for the 1999 Ministerial Conference—Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, ¶
14, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/247 (July 9, 1999) [hereinafter Communication
from Indonesia and Singapore] (proposing classification of certain digital
products as intellectual property rights rather than goods or services).
161. See Baker et al., supra note 26, at 6 (citing Communication from Australia, Work Programme on Electronic Commerce—Objectives for Treatment of Electronic Commerce, at 2, WTO Doc. WT/GC/25 (July 5, 1999)) (“[I]t is generally agreed that in order to avoid the need to develop an entirely new trade
regime, e-products should not be classified as something other than goods
or services.”).
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designed with digital trade in mind, discarding it altogether
may not be the best way to address the digital trade issue. As
Sam Fleuter argues, “considering the glacial pace of international negotiation and the amount of time spent developing
the current regime of international trade law, it seems paradoxical to conclude that the best solution is for the WTO to
write a whole new body of law.”162 Furthermore, the sui
generis approach is unlikely to provide a long-term solution to
an issue as ever-changing as digital trade. When the sui generis
rules are once again outpaced by technology—which is inevitable given the fast-changing nature of technology—the old sui
generis rules will have to be replaced by new sui generis rules
to keep up with technological advancement.163
Similarly, this article argues that efforts to advance digital
trade at the multilateral level should focus on negotiating basic framework rules and applying widely accepted, existing
rules to digital trade issues. This approach requires the world
trading community to set aside certain issues, such as the classification of digital products and the moratorium on customs
duties on digital transmissions, that are theoretically important
but practically less so. It also requires WTO members to negotiate a new system for classifying services under the GATS and,
less importantly, the market access and national treatment
commitments that would go along with the new classification
system. Finally, WTO members need to collectively agree on
the best ways to apply basic WTO rules to significant non-tariff
barriers to digital trade, such as data localization measures.
A. The Classification of Digital Products
Whether digital products should be classified as goods or
services has been recognized as a “particularly contentious” issue.164 Fortunately, the WTO can move forward on digital
trade without solving the classification issue. Classification is
not an issue for most digital products. For the one category of
digital products for which classification is an issue—e-products—classification is the consequence, not the cause, of the
162. Fleuter, supra note 26, at 175.
163. Id.
164. MIRA BURRI, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. & WORLD
ECON. FORUM, SHOULD THERE BE NEW MULTILATERAL RULES FOR DIGITAL
TRADE? 3 (2013).
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real underlying problem. Instead of being distracted by the
classification issue, the WTO should shift its resources to finding a negotiated solution to the underlying problem.
First, while the classification issue has been a focus of the
WTO’s digital trade agenda thus far,165 classifying most ditigal
products is relatively straightforward. There is a “broad consensus” that tangible goods ordered and paid for on the Internet should be treated as goods and subject to GATT
rules.166 Similarly, it is not controversial to classify services delivered on the Internet as services governed by the GATS, despite there being some disputes over which mode of supply
under the GATS should apply.167
The line between goods and services, however, starts to
get blurred for certain new technologies. “Additive manufacturing” and 3D printing provide useful examples.168 Additive
manufacturing involves the transmission of an electronic file
via the Internet to enable the manufacturing of a good at a
remote location, sometimes across national borders.169 The
question arises whether the electronic file sent over the Internet should be treated as a good or a service. The answer to
this question is less straightforward than in the cases of goods
ordered online and services delivered electronically because
“the transmission of data would substitute for the transportation of goods.”170 From the cross-border movement perspec165. See infra Part II(A) for discussion of how the classification issue
stalled the progress of the Work Programme.
166. Baker et al., supra note 26, at 5–6.
167. Id.; see Fleuter, supra note 26, at 158 (noting that “there is little room
for debate on the application of the GATT/GATS framework” to electronically delivered services or digital products delivered through the Internet).
The WTO Council for Trade in Services noted that “[e]ven though it is clear
that the delivery of services by electronic means may take place by any of the
[listed] modes of delivery . . . , it is not always easy to specify whether a
transaction takes place under mode 1 or mode 2.” Council for Trade in
Services, Note by the Secretariat: The Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, ¶ 7,
WTO Doc. S/C/W/68 (Nov. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Work Programme Note by
the Secretariat].
168. Additive manufacturing “operates by applying consecutive layers of a
specific material onto a flat surface until those layers form a three-dimensional object.” Fleuter, supra note 26, at 159.
169. Id. at 160.
170. RICHARD BALDWIN, THE GREAT CONVERGENCE: INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND THE NEW GLOBALIZATION 291 (2016).
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tive, it is not entirely nonsensical to conceive digital data used
in additive manufacturing as goods.171
In one landmark case, ClearCorrect Operating v. International Trade Commission, a U.S. court dealt with the question of
whether digital models of dental aligners sent over the Internet from Pakistan to the United States were goods subject
to import restrictions under U.S. domestic law.172 The U.S. domestic law at issue in the case, the Tariff Act of 1930, authorizes the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) to
remedy only “[u]nfair methods of competition and unfair acts
in the importation of articles.”173 In the initial administrative
agency proceeding, the USITC found that “the term ‘article’
was understood at the time of the enactment of the Tariff Act
to carry the meaning of an identifiable unit, item or thing,
with examples indicating that such articles may be traded in
commerce or used by consumers.”174 This definition, according to the USITC, included digital data.175 On appeal, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit overruled the USITC,
holding that dictionary definitions, the use of the same term
in other sections of the statute, and the statute when understood in its entirety, all support the conclusion that the word
“articles” means “material things,” and does not include digital
data.176 This holding, while grounded in pure statutory interpretation, is consistent with the assumption that digital data
should not be classified as goods even when it takes the place
of physical goods. From a policy point of view, this holding is
arguably defensible because the digital data at issue serves different functions from those of the finished goods.177 There171. In 1998—a time before the era of additive manufacturing—the WTO
Secretariat stated that “of course it would be impossible to deliver a tangible
product electronically.” Work Programme Note by the Secretariat, supra note 167,
¶ 37. This conclusion is less obvious today.
172. ClearCorrect Operating, LLC, v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 810 F.3d 1283,
1286–87 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
173. 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (a)(1)(A) (2012).
174. In the Matter of Certain Digital Models, Digital Data, and Treatment
Plans for Use in Making Incremental Dental Positioning Adjustment Appliances: Commission Opinion, Inv. No. 337-TA-833, USITC Pub. 4555, at 39
(Nov. 2017).
175. Id.
176. ClearCorrect Operating, 810 F.3d at 1287, 1290–91.
177. The electronic files transmitted on the internet in additive manufacturing serve the function of enabling the manufacturing the finished prod-
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fore, although the line between goods and services gets
blurred when it comes to additive manufacturing, it is still relatively uncontroversial to classify the digital data involved in additive manufacturing as services, not goods.178
The only category of digital products for which classification is a real issue is e-products.179 Debates over the classification of e-products have been ongoing at the WTO for more
than two decases, with no solutions in sight.180 Part of the reasons for this impasse is technical. Since e-products and their
physical counterparts are all but identical except for the technology of delivery, classifying e-products as services simply because they are intangible would be inconsistent with the principle of technology neutrality.181 Part of the reasons for the
impasse is also political. Two major players in the world trading system, the United States and the European Union, have
been unwilling to retreat from deeply entrenched positions on
e-products. The United States is in favor of a goods classification for e-products because of the “broader reach of WTO disciplines accorded by the GATT . . . .”182 By contrast, the European Union argues that “[e]lectronic deliveries consist of supplies of services which fall within the scope of the GATS.”183
This stance would “ensure that music, films, and similar products delivered electronically fall within the [European Comucts, and are not the finished products themselves. See id. at 1299 (distinguishing the contemporary definition of “merchanise” from the 1979 version, which included “finished goods”).
178. In ClearCorrect Operating, Congress could certainly amend the statute
to make the Tariff Act of 1930 cover digital data involved in additive manufacturing. But that would not change the classification of such digital data as
services. Such amendments would only mean that the Tariff Act of 1930 now
covers both goods and services. See id. at 1291 (deciding that digital data is
not properly defined as a “good” regardless of its absence from the Tariff
Act); see also id. at 1310 (noting Congress has enacted legislation that specifically covers both goods and services).
179. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
180. As discussed earlier, disputes over the classification of e-products
held up the agenda of the WTO Work Programme. See supra notes 89–91
and accompanying text.
181. Baker et al., supra note 26, at 10.
182. Submission by the United States, Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, at 5, WTO Doc. WT/GC/16 (Feb. 12, 1999).
183. Communication from the European Communities and Their Member States, Electronic Commerce Work Programme, ¶ 6(a), WTO Doc. S/C/W/
183 (Nov. 30, 2000).
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munity’s] effective exclusion of audiovisual services from
GATS (through the [European Community’s most-favored nation] exemptions and absence of national treatment and market access commitments for this sector) instead of being subject to GATT 1994.”184
Amid pessimisms on the part of WTO officials on how the
classification issue could be resolved,185 some commentators
have proposed ways to break the logjam.186 As a way to move
forward on the classification issue, these proposals argue for
the classification of e-products as services, in exchange for the
elimination, to varying degrees, of the disparity between GATT
and GATS protections for e-products. Specifically, Catherine
Mann and Sarah Knight would classify e-products as services,
on the condition that all such products be “subject to most
favored nation and national treatment provisions.”187 Stewart
Baker suggests that WTO members “negotiate a solution that
allows nations to treat e-products as services in exchange for
GATS commitments to give e-products trade benefits
equivalent to comparable physical goods.”188 Tania Voon
would go as far as “subject[ing] all audiovisual products under
GATS to the requirements of national treatment and market
access.”189
The above proposals correctly recognize that the source
of difficulties with classifying e-products lies with the differential treatment e-products receive under the GATT and the
GATS.190 It is not clear, however, how the compromises that
184. Tania Voon, A New Approach to Audiovisual Products in the WTO:
Rebalancing GATT and GATS, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007).
185. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
186. For examples of these proposals from commenters, see generally
Catherine L. Mann & Sarah Cleeland Knight, Electronic Commerce in the WTO,
in THE WTO AFTER SEATTLE 253 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2000); Baker et al.,
supra note 26; Voon, supra note 184.
187. Mann & Knight, supra note 186, at 259. Indonesia and Singapore
made a similar proposal at the WTO. Communication from Indonesia and
Singapore, supra note 160, ¶ 14.
188. Baker et al., supra note 26, at 10.
189. Voon, supra note 184, at 19.
190. See Baker et al., supra note 26, at 11 (“[T]he approach is premised on
substantial elimination of the disparity between GATT and GATS protections
for e-products—that is, exactly the disparity that has engendered the classification debate.”); see also Voon, supra note 184, at 9 (“The failure of WTO
Members to agree on how to classify digital products is thus symptomatic of a
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these proposals suggest are indeed compromises. For instance,
Stewart Baker thinks of his approach as a compromise that
benefits both sides: The European Union gets a service classification for e-products, and the United States gets liberalization
commitments under the GATS that are comparable to those
that the GATT provides.191 But the European Union demands
a service classification for e-products not just for the sake of a
service classification. It wants a service classification so that it
could take advantage of the lack of liberalization commitments provided under the GATS. If liberalization commitments were imposed under the GATS, as these proposals call
for, a service classification would be meaningless to the European Union. These proposals, therefore, are indeed one-sided
deals that the European Union is unlikely to accept.
While these proposals do not point to a viable path forward for the classification issue, they do make it clear that the
classification issue is the wrong issue to focus on in future multilateral negotiations on digital trade. The classification issue is
the consequence, not the cause, of the differential treatment
that e-products receive under the GATT and the GATS. If
there is political will for negotiations on e-products, the negotiations should focus on the question of the degree to which
such differential treatment should be eliminated. If the classification issue is not amenable to negotiations under the current trade and political environments, then WTO members
should set the classification issue aside and move on to other
issues, instead of letting the classification issue hold back the
rest of the digital trade agenda.
Those who are concerned about the prospect of leaving
the classification issue unresolved may find solace in two mitigating factors. First, e-products are no longer among the most
innovative products in the digital economy. With the rapid
growth of digitally delivered services (such as social media)
and products that combine both physical goods and digital serlarger difficulty, namely the starkly different treatment of audiovisual products under GATT 1994 and GATS.”).
191. Baker obviously believed that his proposal was a compromise proposal that would make it much easier for the parties to reach an agreement on
the classification issue. See Baker et al., supra note 26, at 10–11 (“The clear
benefits of the approach are that it would avoid both the practical difficulties
. . . and the costs that would be associated with prolonged debate and dispute resolution regarding the classification of e-products.”).
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vices (commonly called the Internet of Things (IoT)), the importance of traditional e-products should decline over time.192
So, even if the classification of e-products remains unresolved
for a long period of time, any harm should be well contained.
Second, what trade negotiators fail to resolve can be tackled
through judicial interpretation. If and when disputes over the
classification of e-products arise, WTO dispute settlement
panels and the Appellate Body can weigh in on the issue. If
handled properly, such judicial interpretation may lead to a
set of commonly accepted principles that will facilitate the
eventual resolution of the issue.193
B. Moratorium on Customs Duties on Digital Transmissions
Another focal point in past negotiations on digital trade
has been the moratorium on customs duties for digital transmissions. Declared at the second WTO Ministerial Conference
and extended at every subsequent Ministerial Conference except in Seattle,194 the moratorium remains a high priority for
nations that are making renewed pushes for new multilateral
negotiations on electronic commerce.195 However, as dis192. Andrew Mitchell and Neha Mishra go as far as declaring that e-products are “practically irrelevant” in the digital age. Mitchell & Mishra, supra
note 49, at 1111 (“Given that many recent digital innovations combine different kinds of digital content with both services and physical devices, the
debate on the equivalence of physical products (e.g., books and CDs containing programs or music) and electronic products (e.g., downloadable ebooks, music, or software) is practically irrelevant in the digital age.”).
193. In this respect, a recent WTO dispute settlement proceeding may
have taken the first step in tackling the classification of e-products. In Brazil—Certain Measures Concerning Taxation and Charges, a WTO dispute settlement panel found that certain Brazilian tax measures favoring domestic information technology and automation products were inconsistent with
paragraphs two and four of GATT Article III. See Panel Report, Brazil—Certain Measures Concerning Taxation and Charges, ¶¶ 7.61-7.70, WTO Doc. WT/
DS472/R (adopted Jan. 11, 2019). The products at issue included not only
physical information technology and automation goods, but also software,
without distinguishing between software on physical media and digitally delivered software. Brazil—Certain Measures Concerning Taxation and Charges,
supra, ¶ 2.46. The panel, therefore, implicitly held that digitally delivered
software is subject to disciplines under the GATT.
194. See supra notes 92–93 and accompanying text.
195. See, e.g., General Council Chairman, Item 4—Work Programme on Electronic Commerce—Review of Progress, ¶ 1.8, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/756 (Dec.
17, 2018) (“It is my hope that discussions [on the e-commerce moratorium]
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cussed below, the moratorium is theoretically problematic, of
limited practical significance, and ineffective in reigning in
barriers to digital trade. It can, and should, be dispensed with
if doing so would remove an obstacle to multilateral dialogues
on digital trade.
Hailed as “an important first step in the WTO’s consideration of how the rules-based trading system should apply to
electronic commerce,”196 the moratorium has received wide
support as a temporary measure. Commentators have called
for making the moratorium permanent.197 Some WTO members, however, are ambivalent about that idea. Among the major trading bodies, both the United States and the European
Union support the moratorium, but the European Union is
willing to make it permanent only on the condition that eproducts be classified as services.198 Some WTO members
question the scope of the moratorium, particularly whether
the moratorium applies to e-products.199 Some developing
countries fear a permanent loss of customs revenues if the
moratorium is made permanent.200 Such concerns appear to
can continue in a transparent, inclusive and Member-driven manner, keeping in mind the need for a decision on the moratorium by the end of
2019.”).
196. SACHA WUNSCH-VINCENT, MARKLE FOUND., WTO, E-COMMERCE, AND
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES: FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND THROUGH THE
DOHA DEVELOPMENT AGENDA 140 (Joanna McIntosh ed., 2004).
197. See, e.g., BURRI, supra note 164, at 7 (“[T]he number one priority . . .
will involve, at a minimum, . . . an extension of the duty-free moratorium or
making it permanent.”).
198. Herman, supra note 99, at 9.
199. See Communication from the Chairman of the Council for Trade in
Goods, Interim Review of Progress in the Implementation of the Work Programme on
Electronic Commerce, ¶ 4.2, WTO Doc. WT/GC/24 (Apr. 12, 1999) (“There
seemed to be agreement by delegations that goods that were sold or marketed by electronic means, but still delivered physically across borders,
would be subject to the existing WTO commitments and provisions related
to trade in goods, e.g. customs duties.”).
200. See Ambassador Alfredo Suescum—Friend of the Chair, Item 4—Work
Programme on Electronic Commerce—Review of Progress, ¶ 1.6, WTO Doc. WT/
GC/W/721, (Aug. 1, 2016) (“Regarding the moratorium, the positions of
Members remained the same. Some had suggested making the mortarium
permanent or extending it for a period longer than two years. Others were
uncomfortable doing so, especially given the lack of data on the moratorium’s possible effects.”).
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be primarily focused on the potential loss of customs revenues
from e-products.201
Fortunately, making the moratorium permanent, or simply continuing to extend it, is not necessary for the multilateral digital trade agenda. Several aspects of the moratorium,
both theoretically and practically, cast doubt on the validity
and relevance of the moratorium.
First, while the moratorium certainly has a simplistic appeal in banning customs duties on all electronic transmissions,
it is inconsistent with the widely accepted principle of technology neutrality.202 Under the moratorium, digital downloads of
music, movies, and software are exempted from customs duties, while the same products when delivered in physical form
are not. This is not just a theoretical concern, since suppliers
of physical media products are disadvantaged vis-à-vis suppliers
of online products.203
Second, the haggling between developing countries and
developed countries over the fiscal implications of the moratorium is unnecessary. According to one estimate, “even if all
delivery of digitizable media products moved online—an unlikely prospect—the revenue loss would be small.”204 And even
201. See Communication from India and South Africa, Work Programme on
Electronic Commerce—Moratorium on Customs Duties on Electronic Transmissions:
Need for a Re-Think, ¶ 2.2, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/747 (July 12, 2018) (“[A]
moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions could imply that
customs duties are not imposed on products exported in digitalised form,
even if the bound rate on the same product, if it is delivered in the physical
form, is not zero. Thus, a moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions could in effect undermine the existing schedule of tariff concessions of WTO Members. Given the fact that the average bound tariffs of
developing countries are considerably higher than those of developed countries, a moratorium on customs duties on electronic transmissions could significantly alter the negotiated balance of rights and obligations.”).
202. Marsoof, supra note 158, at 298.
203. According to one study, the imposition of customs duties resulted in
a “significant decrease in the purchases of CDs from the United States.”
Jean-Pierre Le Gall, Trading on Internet: Tax Aspects, 1998 INT’L BUS. L.J. 357,
365 (1998).
204. Aaditya Mattoo & Ludger Schuknecht, Trade Policies for Electronic Commerce 10 (World Bank Policy Research Working Papers, Paper No. 2380,
2000), https://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-2380.
The same estimate states that India, as an example, “would lose only 0.4 per
cent of tariff revenue and 0.1 per cent of total revenue” if such a shift happened. Mattoo & Schuknecht, supra at 10.
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if the potential revenue losses were significant, a moratorium
would still be unnecessary because it is “nearly impossible to
reliably enforce customs duties on e-products.”205 To levy customs duties on electronic transmissions, customs officials
would need to be “able to trace and establish the value” of
electronic transactions, a highly complex and costly process.206
“[T]echnological limitations” may stop WTO members from
imposing customs duties on electronic transmissions “for some
time.”207 In fact, “the current customs duty moratorium on
electronic transmissions is probably in large part motivated by
this reality.”208 Thus, the moratorium is binding only “because
of the practical difficulties in actually trying to assess duties on
electronic transmissions.”209 Therefore, countries would not
be able to rush to levy customs duties on electronic transmissions if the moratorium were lifted today.
Finally, the limited scope of the moratorium makes it ineffective in curbing trade barriers to electronic transmissions.
The moratorium only applies to customs duties, just one category of the tariff and non-tariff barriers to digital trade. A moratorium on customs duties would not preclude WTO members
from resorting to other—arguably more costly—policy instruments, such as quotas or discriminatory taxes, to prevent digital transactions.210 One notable example of the moratorium’s
limited applicability is its inability to prevent WTO members
from pursuing initiatives to levy digital services taxes. In March
2018, the European Commission proposed a digital services
tax that “would tax the part of a digital firm’s revenues attributed to European member states” if the firm meets certain revenue requirements.211 In March 2019, the French government
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

Baker et al., supra note 26, at 10.
Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 36, at 10.
Voon, supra note 184, at 18.
Baker et al., supra note 26, at 10.
U.S. Looks for WTO Guidelines on E-Commerce by Cancun Ministerial, 20
INSIDE U.S. TRADE, no. 38, Sept. 20, 2002.
210. See Work Programme Note by the Secretariat, supra note 167, ¶ 35 (noting
that commitments on customs duties do not apply to “border measures like
tariffs and quotas”); see also Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 36, at 9–10 (discussing other policy options available for regulation of e-commerce).
211. GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & ZHIYAO (LUCY) LU, THE EUROPEAN UNION’S
PROPOSED DIGITAL SERVICES TAX 1 (2018). The revenues requirements are
global revenues exceeding _750 million and E.U. revenues exceeding _50
million in a financial year. HUFBAUER & LU, supra at 1.
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unveiled plans to impose a three percent tax on the French
revenues of digital companies that meet certain revenue requirements.212 In July 2019, France officially approved the digital services tax, applying the tax retroactively from early
2019.213 While some argue that the digital services tax acts as a
de facto tariff because the firms that would be subject to it are
overwhelmingly from the United States,214 as a formal matter,
such a tax is an internal tax levied on corporate revenues, so
the customs duty moratorium would not be implicated.215 Indeed, the customs duty moratorium would actually incentivize
WTO members to pursue non-tariff measures with identical or
similar effects.
While the moratorium on customs duties for electronic
transmissions is not necessary for the multilateral digital trade
agenda, it does serve a signaling function—it is a signal that
the WTO is “in favor of barrier-free electronic trade.”216 But
the question is at what cost should this signal be preserved. If
the moratorium risks further splintering the world trading
community, then it should be dropped from the multilateral
negotiating agenda. At this delicate junction, it is simply not
worthwhile to dedicate the institutional resources of the WTO
to a matter that has only limited significance and effectiveness.

212. Why Amazon, Facebook and Google Will Be Hit with an Extra 3% Tax,
MARKETWATCH (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/
french-government-to-tax-digital-giants-like-amazon-google-and-facebook2019-03-06?mod=MW_latestnews. The revenues requirements are global revenues exceeding _750 million and French revenues exceeding _25 million.
Why Amazon, Facebook and Google Will Be Hit with an Extra 3% Tax, supra.
213. France Passes Tax on Tech Giants Despite US Threats, BBC NEWS (July 11,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-48947922.
214. For an example of this argument, see HUFBAUER & LU, supra note
211, at 8–9. The revenues requirements are “designed to capture Google,
Facebook, Amazon, eBay, Uber, Airbnb,” and other U.S. digital firms. HUFBAUER & LU, supra at 8.
215. Note that it could be argued that the digital services tax violates the
spirit, if not the letter, of the customs duty moratorium. See id. at 8 (“While
the ministerial declaration is not a binding obligation, the European Union
cannot, in the same breath, claim to honor the declaration and enact the
[digital services tax].”).
216. Wunsch-Vincent, supra note 36, at 10.
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C. GATS
Yet another issue that is central to the multilateral efforts
on digital trade is the GATS. Due to the outdated nature of the
GATS, WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body
have been resorting to judicial interpretations to try to fit digital trade into the existing GATS framework. Those judicial interpretations, however, may not reflect what WTO members
had in mind when negotiating the GATS, lending to charges
of judicial activism that undermine the WTO’s legitimacy. A
top priority of any future negotiations on digital trade, therefore, should be to negotiate basic framework rules aimed at
retrofitting the GATS for the digital age.
As discussed above, major gaps in the GATS make it difficult to determine what market access and national treatment
commitments are applicable to specific services, particularly
digitally delivered services.217 To fill those gaps, WTO dispute
settlement panels and the Appellate Body adopted “evolutionary” interpretations of the GATS in an effort to accommodate
new technologies and new services within the existing legal
framework.218
In United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of
Gambling and Betting Services, a WTO dispute settlement panel
and the WTO Appellate Body analyzed online gambling services under mode one of the GATS (cross-border supply of services).219 Prior to that case, the principle of technology neutrality was widely considered to dictate that GATS commitments apply to services “provided through any means of
technology.”220 But there had been disagreements among
WTO members as to whether services delivered on the Internet, a technology not in existence when the GATS was
217. See supra Part I(B)(1).
218. Hodson, supra note 52, at 18.
219. See AB Report in US—Gambling, supra note 46, ¶ 215 (“In this case, the
relevant entry for mode 1 supply in the market access column . . . of the
United States’ Schedule reads ‘None’.”); Panel Report in US—Gambling, supra
note 54, ¶ 415 (“This dispute concerns one of the four modes of supply
under the GATS, that is, the so-called ‘cross-border supply’ of gambling and
betting services . . . .”).
220. Group on Basic Telecommunications, Note by the Chairman (Revision):
Notes for Scheduling Basic Telecom Services Commitments, ¶ 1(c), WTO Doc. S/
GBT/W/2/Rev. 1 (Jan. 16, 1997).
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adopted, were nonetheless within the scope of the GATS.221
The panel in US—Gambling took a more restrictive view of the
concept of technology neutrality and found that “a market access commitment for mode 1 [under the GATS] implies the
right for other Members’ suppliers to supply a service through
all means of delivery, whether by mail, telephone, Interect etc.,
unless otherwise specified in a Member’s Schedule.”222 In
reaching this conclusion, the panel partially relied on the
United States’ own statement that “there should be no question that where market access and national treatment commitments exist, they encompass the delivery of the service
through electronic means, in keeping with the principle of
technological neutrality.”223 The panel concluded that “where
a full market access commitment has been made for mode 1, a
prohibition on one, several or all means of delivery included
in this mode 1 would be a limitation on market access for the
mode.”224
Five years later, a WTO dispute settlement panel and the
WTO Appellate Body revisited the principle established in
US—Gambling, and reached essentially the same result, albeit
on different grounds. One question at issue in China—Publications and Audiovisual Products was whether China’s market access commitments on “sound recording distribution services”
included the “distribution of sound recordings through elec221. Some WTO members argued that new, specific commitments under
the GATS were needed for such electronically delivered services. See, e.g.,
Committee on Trade in Financial Services, Note by the Secretariat: Report of the
Meeting Held on 9 May 2001, ¶ 11, WTO Doc. S/FIN/M/31 (June 1, 2001)
(“India’s preliminary view was that given the bottom-up approach of the
GATS, the commitments for new services delivered through new technologies would have to be taken afresh and existing commitments would not
apply to them.”). Some other WTO members argued that Internet-delivered
services are covered by the GATS. See, e.g., Council for Trade in Services, Note
by the Secretariat: Report of the Meeting Held on 28 June and 2 July 2004, WTO
Doc. TN/S/M/11 (Sept. 8, 2004) (stating that the representative of Hong
Kong, China was open to discussion on how electronic delivery of services
should be treated under the GATS, but did not “rule out [pursuing] a common understanding . . . as to how services could be treated in the current
scheduling approach”).
222. Panel Report in US—Gambling, supra note 54, ¶ 671.
223. Id. at 202 n.836 (quoting Work Programme Submission by the United
States, supra note 37, at 3).
224. Id. ¶ 671.
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tronic means.”225 The United States invoked the principle of
technology neutrality and argued that “the GATS is sufficiently
dynamic so that Members need not renegotiate the Agreement or their commitments in the face of ever-changing technology.”226 China countered that “the principle of ‘technological neutrality’ is irrelevant . . . because network music services
are a service distinct from the distribution of sound recordings
in physical form, and cannot be considered as a mere means
of delivery of sound recording distribution services.”227 Ruling
in favor of the United States, the panel avoided the issue of
technology neutrality and instead “examined the ordinary
meaning of the terms of China’s commitment.”228 According
to the panel, since China had the opportunity to specify desired qualifications to the scope of inscribed services, but
chose not to, the core meaning of China’s commitment on
sound recording distribution services had to be interpreted to
cover the distribution of audio content in nonphysical form.229
On appeal, the Appellate Body upheld the panel’s finding.230
Specifically, the Appellate Body noted that “the terms used in
China’s GATS Schedule (‘sound recording’ and ‘distribution’)
are sufficiently generic that what they apply to may change
over time.”231
In another dispute settlement proceeding, China—Electronic Payment Services, a WTO dispute settlement panel disposed of the question of whether China’s market access commitment on “[a]ll payment and money transmission services”
applied to electronic payment services for payment card transactions, even though the application to electronic payment
services for payment card transactions was not specified in
225. Panel Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribution
Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶ 7.1154,
WTO Doc. WT/DS363/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2010) [hereinafter China—Publications and Audiovisual Products].
226. Id. ¶ 7.1160.
227. Id. ¶ 7.1166.
228. Id. ¶ 7.1253.
229. Id. ¶¶ 7.1254–1255.
230. Appellate Body Report, China—Measures Affecting Trading Rights and
Distribution Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, ¶ 412, WTO Doc. WT/DS363/AB/R (adopted Jan. 19, 2010).
231. Id. ¶ 396.
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China’s GATS schedule.232 The panel examined the ordinary
meaning of the relevant terms used to describe the services
contained in China’s schedule, the context of those terms, and
the object and purpose of the GATS and the WTO Agreement.233 Based on this analysis, the panel concluded that the
scope of China’s schedule included the services at issue.234
The panel noted that “a ‘sector’ may include ‘any service activity that falls within the scope of the definition of that sector,’
whether or not these activities are explicitly enumerated in the
definition of that sector or subsector.”235 According to the
panel, “there cannot be any ‘payment service’ and ‘money
transmission service’ if the payment is not effected and the
money not transferred from the customer’s account to the
merchant’s account.”236 Electronic payment services, therefore, “are necessarily included within the scope of the definition of that subsector because they must operate together for
the payment and money transmission service to be supplied.”237
These findings by WTO panels and the Appellate Body
might be well reasoned, but a major problem with them is that
they ignore WTO members’ original intent in determining
whether to include a specific service in the member’s GATS
schedule. Under these findings, whether a WTO member intended to schedule a market access or national treatment commitment for a specific service does not matter; what matters is
whether such a commitment can be attributed to the WTO
member under the criteria established by the panels and Appellate Body.238
232. Request for Consultation by the United States, China—Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services, at 1–2, WTO Doc. WT/DS413/1
(Sept. 15, 2010).
233. Panel Report, China—Certain Measures Affecting Electronic Payment Services, ¶ 7.74, WTO Doc. WT/DS413/R, (adopted Aug. 31, 2012).
234. Id. ¶ 7.204.
235. Id. ¶ 7.179.
236. Id. ¶ 7.180.
237. Id.
238. The United States made the same argument in China—Publications
and Audiovisual Products. There, the United States argued that whether
China intended to make a market access commitment on the electronic distribution of sound recordings did not matter, because “[i]n US—Gambling,
the panel made clear that a Member’s intent is not relevant in discerning
whether the Member has a commitment with respect to a particular means
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Failure to take account of WTO members’ intent regarding their GATS commitments is certainly concerning. According to an official WTO document, “[t]he GATS is a very flexible agreement that allows each Member to adjust the conditions of market entry and participation to its sector-specific
objectives and constraints.”239 Such objectives and constraints,
however, may vary not only from sector to sector, but also from
technology to technology. When new technologies change the
way services are delivered, new industries invariably emerge
around the new technologies. Even if the new industries may,
from a philosophical point of view, be said to provide the same
services as previously existing industries,240 the market conditions and regulatory policies for the new industries cannot be
assumed to be the same. Consequently, the factors that may
have led a country to liberalize one industry delivering a certain service via one technology may not always be present in
another industry delivering the service via a different technology. This is particularly the case when the new industry did not
exist and could not have been foreseen when the GATS commitments were initially made. One example of a different market and regulatory parameters for industries furnishing the
same services using different technologies is the telecommunications and Internet industries, which provide overlapping services. GATS commitments for telecommunications services
tend to be “less liberal” than for computer and related services
(which encompass Internet-related services), because telecommunications are “a sensitive sector which is often monopolized
by an incumbent state-owned enterprise.”241 By contrast, WTO
members have made far-reaching commitments to liberalize
computer and related services, because when the GATS was
negotiated in the Uruguay Round, “computer and related services were a fairly new sector . . . and thus largely devoid of
of delivery.” China—Publications and Audiovisual Products, supra note 225, ¶
7.1159.
239. 1.7 Conditional Granting of Market Access and National Treatment,
WORLD TRADE ORG.: GATS TRAINING MODULE, https://www.wto.org/english
/tratop_e/serv_e/cbt_course_e/c1s7p1_e.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2019).
240. In China—Publications and Audiovisual Products, parties disputed
whether network music services are the same services as the distribution of
sound recordings in physical form. See supra note 225 and accompanying
text.
241. Hodson, supra note 52, at 12.
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domestic regulation and trade barriers.”242 In part because of
these different markets and regulatory conditions, it has not
been resolved in WTO negotiations whether GATS commitments on basic telecommunication services include Internet
services.243
Thus, a strong argument could be made that applying the
principle of technology neutrality to the GATS would be misguided. Instead of achieving “progressive liberalization” as envisioned under the Preamble and Article XIX of the GATS,244
the principle of technology neutrality would force WTO members to commit, once and for all, to all service industries delivering the same service using different technologies, whether
or not the technologies exist or are foreseeable. Such a drastic
approach would further undermine the WTO’s legitimacy and
prolong the multilateral rulemaking process on digitally delivered services.
Although the approaches that the WTO dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body developed in these particular instances were misguided, that is not to say that the WTO
dispute settlement mechanism does not play an important role
in the overall WTO rulemaking process. When there are ambiguities and uncertainties in WTO law, as is the case with the
GATS, initial solutions obtained through the dispute settlement process may not be sound, but serve as important reference points for future debates and negotiations. Ideally, there
should be a feedback mechanism that translates, either affirmatively or negatively, findings by dispute settlement panels and
the Appellate Body on binding statutory rules that reflect con242. Mira Burri, The Governance of Data and Data Flows in Trade Agreements:
The Pitfalls of Legal Adaptation, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 65, 84 (2017). In China,
for example, private firms have a tendency to beat out incumbent stateowned enterprises in new sectors because of the lack of state capture by the
incumbents. Curtis J. Milhaupt & Wentong Zheng, Beyond Ownership: State
Capitalism and the Chinese Firm, 103 GEO. L.J. 665, 699 (2015).
243. Hodson, supra note 52, at 12.
244. See GATS, supra note 24, pmbl. (“Wishing to establish a multilateral
framework of principles and rules for trade in services with a view to the
expansion of such trade under conditions of transparency and progressive
liberalization . . . .”); GATS, supra note 24, art. XIX:1 (“In pursuance of the
objectives of this Agreement, Members shall enter into successive rounds of
negotiations, beginning not later than five years from the date of entry into
force of the WTO Agreement and periodically thereafter, with a view to
achieving a progressively higher level of liberalization.”).
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sensus among WTO members. The only way this could happen
is through multilateral negotiations that build on judicial findings by dispute settlement panels and the Appellate Body.
This analysis points to the direction in which multilateral
efforts on the GATS, as it relates to digital trade, should proceed. Instead of trying to enact fundamental changes to the
GATS, as commentators who propose a “negative list” approach for the GATS suggest,245 WTO members should focus
on negotiating a better service classification system, as well as
new market access and national treatment commitments that
go with a new classification system. This approach would not
necessarily lead to further liberalization, but would make the
GATS better able to respond to the emergence of digital trade.
Specifically, the top priority of trade negotiators in the
ongoing multilateral negotiations on digital trade should be to
update the preferred service classification system of the GATS,
the W/120. As discussed earlier, W/120 was developed based
on the U.N. Provisional CPC in force in 1990.246 Since then,
the U.N. CPC system has been updated several times, while the
GATS system remains “pre-digital.”247 It is of paramount importance, therefore, to adopt a classification system that accounts for the digital economy.248 Furthermore, since the
245. See, e.g., MELTZER, supra note 44, at 16 (“For a dynamic and fast
changing sector like the Internet economy, over time a negative list approach leads to greater trade liberalization as it automatically captures further liberalizing changes to countries laws and regulations, whereas a positive list freezes the level of commitments at the time they were negotiated
and updating these rules requires further negotiations, with all the transaction costs this entails.”); Tuthill & Roy, supra note 58, at 159 (suggesting that
negative list agreements “can minimise . . . the uncertainties that may arise
regarding scope and coverage”). Under the negative list approach, anything
not excluded from the list of market access and national treatment commitments is covered. Ines Willemyns, GATS Classification of Digital Services—Does
the “Cloud” Have a Silver Lining?, 53 J. WORLD TRADE 59, 66 (2019). The negative list approach “is considered as the next step in the liberalization of services trade, as it would automatically include new or unforeseen services.”
Willemyns, supra at 66.
246. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
247. Sen, supra note 21, at 341.
248. The updated U.N. CPC list makes it easier to classify digitally delivered services. Id. at 342. The new classification system under the GATS, however, does not have to reference the U.N. CPC system. See id. at 342 (implying that the GATS is not limited by the U.N. CPC system by discussing the
options it provides.)
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question of how services should be classified is a purely technical one, starting off with the classification system would provide an area for agreement and consensus in the multilateral
negotiations on digital trade.
Once a new system for classifying services is in place, the
next step should be to open negotiations on market access and
national treatment commitments in light of the new classification system. This step would be more politically sensitive and
controversial, as it would impact WTO members’ obligations
under the GATS. It is also possible that some WTO members
may choose lower levels of commitment than those that the
dispute settlement proceedings discussed above currently require. Even if countries took that approach, it would still be a
better outcome than liberalization imposed by WTO dispute
settlement panels and the Appellate Body. Such high-handed
liberalization threatens the long-term legitimacy of the WTO.
D. Data Localization Measures
Finally, a major task for the world trading community is to
collectively agree on the best ways to tackle the the most common non-tariff barriers to digital trade: data localization measures.
To reign in data localization measures, the best solution
would be to reach a multilateral agreement on their use. Indeed, some limited progress has been made on this front. The
revamped Trans-Pacific Partnership, for example, contains
stringent provisions on data localization measures that go beyond the typical market access and national treatment requirements of the GATS.249 But this limited progress has not been
replicated at the WTO level. Under the Work Programme,
WTO members have sharply disagreed on the regulation of
the Internet and Internet-based services.250 Specifically, developing countries from Africa have expressed strong support for
249. Hodson, supra note 52, at 4. The revamped Trans-Pacific Partnership
does include an exception that would allow a member to restrict data flows
for legitimate public policy purposes. Hodson, supra note 52, at 4–5.
250. See Mitchell & Mishra, supra note 49, at 1084–86 (describing the different approaches to regulating the digital economy among WTO member
states).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYI\52-2\NYI204.txt

2020]

unknown

Seq: 51

CHALLENGE TO INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

24-FEB-20

15:33

589

the use of “digital industrial policy,” an important component
of which is data localization measures.251
Since multilateral agreements on data localization measures are not realistic at this time, the WTO needs to find
other solutions. Many commentators have proposed using existing WTO rules to do just that.252 Among others, Daniel
Crosby suggests challenging data localization measures as violations of a WTO member’s commitments for the “[d]ata
processing services” and “[d]ata base services” subsectors.253
Lee Tuthill argues that data localization measures should be
attacked as violations of the national treatment and local content commitments under mode three of the relevant sectors.254 Susannah Hodson argues that “a data localization measure could breach a Member’s market access and national
treatment commitments for the subsectors of data processing

251. See Communication from the African Group, Work Programme on Electronic Commerce—Report of Panel Discussion on “Digital Industrial Policy and Development,” ¶ 1.7, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/133 (July 20, 2017) (“[D]igital integration needs to be preceded by building national capabilities through what
may be termed digital industrial policy. . . . For instance, it was highlighted
that some countries have used policy tools such as data localization requirements, internet filtering, and technology transfer requirements (i.e. disclosure of source code) to promote domestic digital firms and allow them to
catch-up with the leading multinational firms.”).
252. See, e.g., DANIEL CROSBY, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE & SUSTAINABLE DEV. &
WORLD ECON. FORUM, ANALYSIS OF DATA LOCALIZATION MEASURES UNDER
WTO SERVICES TRADE RULES AND COMMITMENTS 5–6 (2016), http://e15initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Policy-Brief-Crosby-Final.pdf
(suggesting that data localization measures could violate member commitments to “data services” subsectors); L. Lee Tuthill, Cross-Border Data Flows:
What Role for Trade Rules?, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRADE IN SERVICES,
supra note 11, at 357, 359, 371 (arguing that data localization measures
could violate member commitments to national treatment and local content); Andrew D. Mitchell & Jarrod Hepburn, Don’t Fence Me In: Reforming
Trade and Investment Law to Better Facilitate Cross-Border Data Transfer, 19 YALE J.
L. & TECH. 182, 200–01 (2017) (suggesting that restrictive data transfer measures could breach market access obligations); Hodson, supra note 52, at 5
(finding that “the GATS does provide a baseline of protection against measures which restrict the cross-border transfer and storage of data”); Mitchell
& Mishra, supra note 49, at 1126–27 (suggesting different options for a solution under the existing GATS structure).
253. CROSBY, supra note 252, at 5–6.
254. Tuthill, supra note 252, at 371.
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services . . . , database services . . . , and data preparation services.”255
One common theme in these proposals is that they all tie
the illegality of data localization measures to the GATS. That,
however, would require a judicial determination of the appropriate service sector and mode of supply for the digitally delivered service at issue, which, as discussed above, is no easy matter.256 Even if such judicial determinations were well reasoned,
there would always be doubts about the extent to which they
comport with WTO members’ original intent in making GATS
commitments. As Andrew Mitchell and Neha Minshra point
out, “the lack of horizontal commitment on cross-border data
flows under the GATS, coupled with the complexity in classification of digital services, makes the nature of legal commitments on cross-border data flows uncertain.”257
Therefore, for the sake of avoiding controversies and preserving the WTO’s legitimacy, a better course of action on
data localization measures would be to stay away from legal
challenges predicated upon WTO members’ market access
and national treatment commitments under the GATS. Instead, WTO members should seek consensus-based solutions
that preserve WTO members’ policy space in data regulation.
Under the GATS, one such option is to challenge data localization measures as violations of WTO members’ horizontal,
most-favored-nation obligations, which do not depend on the
classification of service sectors or the choice of mode of supply.258 Another potential option is to seek a negotiated outcome that would allow WTO members to restrict the cross-border transfer of certain types of data, such as personal and social data.259
In addition, there might be legal avenues outside of the
GATS for challenging data localization measures. All of the existing proposals on data localization measures are based on the
assumption that data localization measures are to be handled
255. Hodson, supra note 52, at 11.
256. See supra Part I(B)(1).
257. Mitchell & Mishra, supra note 49, at 1093.
258. For example, the “adequacy” test under the E.U. GDPR is susceptible
to most-favored nation challenges: Under the adequacy test, data can only be
transferred to certain third countries. Sen, supra note 21, at 335.
259. See id. at 346–47 (suggesting a “data differentiated approach” to combating data localization measures).
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under the GATS, not the GATT, because data is usually transferred “without requiring any transfer of physical commodities.”260 However, for at least one product category—IoT—the
transfer of service data does require the transfer of physical
devices.261 This points to a potential way to challenge data localization measures under the GATT. Since data localization
measures make it more costly for businesses to operate IoT
services, an indispensable supplement to the physical IoT devices,262 a strong argument could be made that they constitute
less favorable treatment than that accorded to similar domestic products by discouraging the sale of foreign IoT devices.
This would be a potential violation of paragraph 4 of Article
III of the GATT, which requires foreign products to be accorded “treatment no less favourable than that accorded to
like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering
for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use.”263 Of
course, whether a specific data localization measure indeed violates GATT Article III:4 will depend on whether it could be
excepted under Article XX of the GATT, which provides defenses to a violation of Article III:4 based on legitimate policy
objectives.264 Since the facts and circumstances of every data
localization measure differ, the legality of data localization
measures should be determined through case-by-case analysis.
Using Article III of the GATT to discipline data localization measures has some advantages. First, there is plenty of
precedent for challenging discriminatory regulations on services as less favorable treatment for the sale of underlying
260. Mitchell & Hepburn, supra note 252, at 196; see also Hodson, supra
note 52, at 7 (“As most digital trade does not involve the transfer of physical
goods, the most relevant WTO Agreement for addressing data localization
restrictions is the GATS.”).
261. This is so because physical IoT devices have to be sold and transferred across the border first for IoT services to commence. See Sen, supra
note 21, at 327 (explaining the connection between IoT and the “surge” of
electronic products).
262. Indeed, it could be argued that consumers buy IoT devices primarily
for the services, not for the physical devices per se. See id. (arguing it is the
“services” embedded in a “smart” product that “confer true value to the
product”).
263. GATT, supra note 22, art. III:4.
264. Id. art. XX.
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goods under Article III of the GATT.265 Putting data localization measures under similar disciplines will benefit from ample guidance provided by case law, as well as wide acceptance
by WTO members of the legitimacy of the practice. Second,
prohibiting data localization measures that constitute less
favorable treatment for the sale of physical goods strikes a
good balance between ensuring free flow of data and preserving WTO members’ policy space in regulating digital trade. It
provides relief against the most outrageous forms of data localization measures, but still gives WTO members freedom to regulate data flows in areas that do not concern trade in goods.266
VI. CONCLUSION
International trade law clearly did not anticipate the digital world in which trade is now taking place, and as a result,
needs to play catch-up. But the question is: How? This article
argues that the world trading community should take heed of
the failures and impasses in past negotiations on digital trade.
Instead of continuing to haggle over conceptually challenging
yet practically insignificant issues, the world trading community should focus on negotiating basic framework rules to
make multilateral rules fit better with digital trade. It should
also focus on the most significant non-tariff barriers to digital
trade. Unless and until this happens, the WTO will continue to
be at risk of becoming increasingly irrelevant in the digital
age.

265. See, e.g., Appellate Body Report, Korea—Measures Affecting Imports of
Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶¶ 178, 185, WTO Doc. WT/DS161/AB/R
(adopted Jan. 10, 2001) (finding that Korea’s dual retail system for beef accorded less favorable treatment to imported beef than the treatment given
to like domestic beef in violation of Article III:4 of the GATT).
266. The WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures
(TRIM) serves as a successful model for this kind of compromise. The TRIM
does not encroach upon WTO members’ policy prerogatives in regulating
foreign investment, but does outlaw foreign investment restrictions that constitute less favorable treatment for the sale of imported goods. Agreement
on Trade-Related Investment Measures, annex, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1868
U.N.T.S. 186.

